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PENSIONS AND THE COST OF SECURITIES
LAW PROTECTION: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF DANIEL v. INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEA MSTERSt
by Susan Wittenberg Liebeler*
I. INTRODUCTION
Persons disappointed in a wide variety of transactions have increas-
ingly found solace under the federal securities laws. The scope of fed-
eral securities regulation was once limited to what most reasonably
knowledgeable persons would recognize in the commercial world as
security instruments. Today, however, various kinds of interests in
chinchillas, 1 live beavers,2 silver foxes,3 whiskey,' rare coins,5 self-im-
provement programs, 6 diamonds,7 religious cults' and other unusual
t 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
* B.A., 1963 (University of Michigan); LL.B., 1966 (U.C.L.A.). Professor of Law, Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974). The court held it
to be a question of fact whether the purchase of chinchillas for raising and breeding consti-
tuted an investment contract under the securities laws.
2. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 905 (1968) (purchase of interest in live beaver ranch investment contract).
3. SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (purchase of interest in silver fox farm
is an investment contract).
4. SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); Glen-Arden Com-
modities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974) (the purchase of an interest in
barrels of aging whiskey constitutes an investment contract).
5. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sale of rare
coin portfolios held investment contract).
6. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973). Turner involved a gigantic pyramiding scheme. Purchasers of "Dare to be
Great" self-motivation courses received the right to sell similar courses to other equally
credulous persons. The content of the courses was minimal--their main value lay in the
purchaser's ability to sell. For example, a person who purchased Adventure IV for $5,000
obtained the right to sell Adventure IV courses at $5,000 each. A $2,500 commission would
be paid for any such sale. Id at 478. The court, in an attempt to protect the "investors,"
held that the sale of the adventures was a "'security' within the meaning of the federal
securities laws." Id See also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974).
7. In Charles Anthony Diamond Invs., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 80,623 (June 15, 1978), the SEC staff refused to issue a no action letter on the
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enterprises have been given the protection of the federal securities laws
in spite of the semantic contortions required to justify this result.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Securities Act)9 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Exchange Act)10 provide an extensive defi-
nition of the term "security." Included in the statutory definitions are
long lists of specific instruments including investment contracts and
participations in any profit-sharing agreements." The latter have
been the focal point of administrative and judicial attention as new and
unanticipated forms of economic activity have been characterized as
securities and subjected to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission).12
This continued growth in the scope of securities regulation has been
nurtured by the Commission which has been quite vigilant in patrol-
ling the "investment" universe. It has come into conflict with other
regulatory bodies when it has sought jurisdiction over matters tradi-
tionally regulated by other federal agencies. 3 By encouraging the ex-
pansion of the definition of a "security," the Commission has
question of whether the sale of diamonds involved the sale of securities subject to the federal
securities laws. The staff reply to the Charles Anthony inquiry stated:
On the basis of the facts presented, particularly (a) the touting of diamonds as an
investment medium appropriate for the entire investing public, (b) the offering of resale
services, (c) installment sales, and (d) the repurchase feature of the proposed program, it
appears that serious questions are raised as to whether a "security" requiring registra-
tion under the Act is being publicly offered and sold.
Id at 86,564.
8. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (defendant minister
induced the faithful to invest their money in "His" economy; transaction held subject to the
securities laws).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
10. Id §§ 78a-78hh.
11. See 1933 Securities Act § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976). The 1934 Exchange Act, §
3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), provides a similar definition. The Supreme Court
has held that the two definitions are "virtually identical." United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975).
12. The genesis of the expansive definition of "security" can be traced to two Supreme
Court cases, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), and SEC v. W.J,
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
See generaly Faust, What is a Security? How Elastic Is the Definition?, 3 SEC. REo. L.J.
219 (1975) for a discussion of problems related to the expansive definitions of "security."
The result, according to Faust, has been "a dissipation of emphasis on the types of problems
with which the Commission should be primarily concerned, and an inappropriate extrusion
of federal securities legislation." Id at 220.
13. For example, the Commission has had a continuing jurisdictional dispute with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See, e.g., SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1029
(N.D. IlL 1976). The SEC has also come into conflict with the Justice Department over
antitrust regulation of stock exchanges, broker dealers and other entities over which the SEC
also has jurisdiction. See Baker, Antitrust Law and Policy in the Securities Industry. A Tale of
T~vo Days in June, 31 Bus. LAW. 743, 746 (1976). See also Merman & Harmance, Imptlica.
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significantly increased its jurisdiction and the need for additional regu-
lations. 4 Many transactions have been "jigsawed" into the securities
law'5 with little apparent regard for the financial and administrative
burdens imposed upon economic activities which historically have
been, and under "common sense" standards should be, regulated by
tort and contract law and state or other federal statutes.'
6
To the private litigant the lure of the securities law is almost irresisti-
ble. Encouraged by the Commission's own attempts to expand the
scope of federal securities law, and eager to avoid application of the
tion of SEC's Victory Over Antitrust Regulation in the Securities Industry." Justice Depart-
ment's Suit Against AT&T on the Line, 2 J. CoRP. LAW 305 (1977).
The Secretary of Labor has opposed the SEC's entry into pension regulation, stating that
application of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws to employee interests in
mandatory, non-contributory pension plans "conflicts with the regulatory program pre-
scribed for plans by Congress in ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act, codi-
fied in substantial part at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976) and in various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954]... wastefully duplicates ERISA disclosure [and] is incon-
sistent with labor law and national labor policy." Brief for Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae at 5, 20, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977)
(cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978)).
In part because of the opposing positions of the SEC and the Department of Labor, the
Solicitor General had great difficulty formulating the position of the United States before
the Supreme Court. 201 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-16, A-19 (Aug. 14, 1978). The Solicitor
General eventually adopted the position of the Labor Department and moved to file an
amicus curiae brief urging reversal of the court of appeals decision in Daniel. However, in
an unusual procedure, the SEC, with the permission of the Solicitor General, has continued
to oppose the position of the Secretary of Labor. The SEC has moved to file its own amicus
curiae brief in the Supreme Court, urging affirmance of the court of appeals decision. 203
PENS. REP. (BNA) A-7 (Aug. 28, 1978). The Supreme Court has denied the Solicitor Gen-
eral's motion to file an amicus brief. However, the SEC will be allowed to argue as amicus
curiae.
14. See, e.g., Briefs for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, United
Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). In Forman, the
Court did not afford the SEC the deference an agency charged with administering a gov-
erning statute normally enjoys. The Court noted as its reason that the SEC brief "flatly
contradicts" its previous position. 421 U.S. at 858 n.25.
15. Professor Cary, an ardent proponent of federal fiduciary standards through new legis-
lation, has criticized this development. "It seems anomalous to jig-saw every kind of corpo-
rate dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as they are presently written."
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: R flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.L 663, 700
(1974) citedin Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 n.17 (1977).
16. In United Hos. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court
restricted the increasingly expansive application of the securities law. In spite of an SEC
amicus curiae brief urging the Court to apply the federal securities laws, the Court held that
non-transferable shares of stock in a government subsidized non-profit housing cooperative
entitling the purchaser to occupy an apartment were not securities and therefore were not
subject to the federal securities laws. The Court looked at the "economic realities" and
found that "the inducement to purchase [the stock] was solely to acquire subsidized low cost
living space, it was not to invest for profit." Id at 851. The decision reflects a more con-
servative attitude than the Court had previously shown toward defining securities.
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Statute of Frauds or similar doctrines restricting recovery under state
or other federal laws, private parties have increasingly sought relief in
the federal securities law. 7 Added incentives are the liberal venue,
service of process and jurisdiction provisions in the federal securities
acts,18 as well as the traditional advantages of federal procedure.' 9
Still another inducement to these plaintiffs has been the willingness
of the judiciary to imply private damage actions under certain sections
of the securities acts, particularly the antifraud sections.20 These plain-
tiffs could seek standing under the several carefully drawn sections of
the securities acts which provide explictly for private damage actions.2'
But, unlike the implied rights under the antifraud sections, these ex-
17. See, e.g., Schlansky v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18. See, e.g., 1933 Securities Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77 v(a) (1976); 1934 Exchange Act § 27,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
19. Several aspects of the federal judicial system are of particular relevance in securities
litigation. Of primary importance is FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 which delineates the method for
bringing shareholder derivative actions in federal court.
A significant aspect of rule 23.1 is its lack of a security for expenses provision. Impor-
tantly, several states do have statutes with security for expenses provisions. For an example
of one such statute, see N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
Another aspect of federal procedure which may prove useful, if not essential, in securities
litigation regards the rules dealing with discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. The purpose
of the federal discovery rules is to bring all relevant, non-privileged facts out in the open.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Hence, the rules have "been generously construed
to provide a great deal of latitude for discovery." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297
(1969).
20. 1933 Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); 1934 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The implication of private damage actions under § 10(b) was ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in a footnote. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court has never decided whether there exists a similar
implied cause of action for sellers under § 17(a). Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 .(1975). The lower courts are divided on the issue. Compare Dyer v.
Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971) with Newman v. Prior, 518
F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975). It has also been suggested that the issue is not important because of
the availability of comparable relief in implied damage actions under § 10(b). SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has recently expressed concern that broadening the class of plaintiffs
with standing to bring implied damage actions under the securities laws will cause more
harm than good. The Court has moved to restrict that class. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (non purchasers and non sellers lack standing to
bring private damage actions under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976) (private damage action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 does not lie for
defendant's negligence; plaintiff must allege scienter); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1 (1977) (unsuccessful tender offeror lacks standing to bring implied private damage
action under § 14(e) and rule lOb-6); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
(breach of fiduciary duty not actionable in private damage action under § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5).
21. 1933 Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) (civil damage action based on mis-
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pressed rights are subject to many restrictions, including short statutes
of limitation,' a security for expenses provision,' reliance require-
ments24 and maximum limits on certain damage awards.25 Largely be-
cause they avoid these restrictions, implied causes of action under the
antifraud provisions have become a Mecca for the disappointed.
This judicial inference of private rights of action, together with the
expansion of the notion of what is a security,26 has created chaos in the
area of civil liability under the securities acts.27 Since regulation of
securities has a significant impact upon the national economy, it is diffi-
cult to imagine an area of the law in which uncertainty could be more
troublesome and inhibiting.28
statements or omissions in registration statement); id. § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1976) (pur-
chaser may sue seller for rescission or damages based on violation of § 5 registration
requirements); id § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976) (purchaser may sue seller for rescission
or damages based on misstatements or omissions in prospectus or oral communication); id. §
15, 15 U.S.C. 77o (1976) (joint and several liability for controlling persons). 1934 Exchange
Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) (buyers and sellers may sue any persons who willfully
manipulates security prices in violation of§ 9(a), (b), or (c)); id § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1976) (corporation or shareholder on its behalf may recover short swing profits from of-
ficers, directors and certain beneficial owners); id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (buyer
or seller reasonably relying upon false or misleading statements in reports filed under § 15
may sue for damages); id § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976) (joint and several liability for control-
ling persons).
22. E.g., 1933 Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976); 1934 Exchange Act §§ 9(e),
18(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c) (1976).
23. 1933 Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) (authorizes the court in its dis-
cretion to require undertaking for payment of suit costs, including attorney's fees, in any suit
brought under the 1933 Securities Act).
24. E.g., 1934 Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (plaintiff must have relied
on false or misleading statement).
25. Eg., 1933 Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) (underwriter's liability
limited to total offering prices of securities underwritten and distributed by him); id § 1 (g),
15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976) (recovery under § 11 cannot exceed price at which securities offered
to public).
26. See notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
27. Professor Loss has expressed it thus:
In the area of civil liability the law has become almost chaotic as a result of the judicial
implication of private rights of action-a development that, however salutory, should
be synchronized with the express civil liability provisions in the several statutes in a way
that appropriately levels the peaks and valleys and reduces the volume of needless liti-
gation.
Loss, Introduction to Proposed Official Draft of Federal Securities Code, [1978] SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) E-l, at E-2 (Apr. 26, 1978).
28. In United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) the Court
stated:
The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was to eliminate serious abuses in a
largely unregulated securities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital market of
the enterprise system: the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
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The federal courts do not appear to have given much attention to the
question of whether the benefits of expanding the federal securities law
are likely to exceed the costs. Nor have they been inclined to ask
whether more cost-effective solutions are available and might be devel-
oped and applied by other institutions. Indeed, the courts do not ap-
pear to have considered the possibility that the costs of any remedy
which could be fashioned might, of necessity, exceed the benefits
thereby conferred.
No one article can hope to survey such a broad field, and the exami-
nation of one new remedy created by such expansion does not neces-
sarily reflect upon the value of others. This article will, nevertheless,
attempt to cast some light upon the general question of the costs and
benefits of that expansion by examining the current attempt to apply
the federal securities law to employee interests in pension plans. Dis-
cussing the probable costs and benefits of that attempt, the article con-
cludes that this particular expansion of securities regulation is not
likely to benefit society, but will, instead, impose considerable costs
which can only add to the apparently significant burdens which gov-
ernment regulation has already imposed on the private pension system.
While this conclusion may not be indicative of the value of other such
expansions, it certainly suggests that the federal courts ought not to be
so ready in the future to expand the scope of federal securities regula-
tion.
An examination of the results of the decades-long judicial expansion
of the federal securities laws raises with particular force the more gen-
eral question of whether the courts are well-suited to perform tasks that
many would characterize as legislative in nature. While there is no
reason to believe that they are well-suited, if they persist in that activ-
ity, they should do so only in those cases in which a rough cost-benefit
estimate indicates that their efforts would not reduce the aggregate
wealth of society.
II. SECURITIES REGULATION OF PENSION PLANS
- A NEW DEVELOPMENT
An example of the dubious benefits of expansion of federal securities
laws may be found in recent developments applying those laws to pen-
sion plans. Historically, the securities law has not been actively used
to regulate pensions. Although pension plans were enjoying increased
the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent
fraud and to protect the interest of investors.
[Vol. I11
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popularity when the securities acts were initially adopted, there was no
reference to pension plans in the original securities acts. Nor is there
any indication in the legislative history that Congress ever considered
the question of whether such plans, or employee interests in them were
securities.29 In the ensuing years the issue never became important
because the SEC adopted the position that interests in pensions did not
involve a sale.3" In the absence of a sale, securities are not subject to
the registration or antifraud provisions of the securities acts.3
Since the passage of the 1933 Securities Act, some statements may
have been made suggesting that some interests in pensions plans are
29. This is not because "in the early 1930's pension plans were still a rarity" as suggested
by the court of appeals in Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1241
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). Murray Latimer had published a monu-
mental two volume study of domestic pension plans in 1932 (M. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1932)) and the same Congress
which enacted the securities acts also passed the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, ch. 868,
§§ 1-8, 48 Stat. 1283. Moreover, Congress had dealt with pension plans several years before
in the context of the tax law when it provided for favorable tax treatment of pension plans in
the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 23(q), 165, 45 Stat. 802, 839. Subsequent studies have
revealed that "[b]etween 1900 and 1933 some 800 industrial institutions adopted and in-
stalled pension plans affecting some 4,000,000 employees." S. REP. No. 610,76th Cong., Ist
Sess. 46 (1939).
The more likely explanation for the failure of Congress to consider or mention pension
plans in connection with the securities acts is that no one thought pension plans bore the
remotest resemblance to securities. See note 47 infra.
30. This view was formally expressed in September 1941 in an opinion of John F. Davis,
then Assistant General Counsel of the SEC: "[N]o 'offer' or 'sale' is involved in the case of a
noncontributory plan, where the employees are not requested to make any contributions, or
in the case of a compulsory plan where there is no element of volition on the part of employ-
ees whether or not to participate and make contributions." [1978] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 2105.53. The staff position was reaffirmed on August 1, 1962 in a letter to CCH
from the Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, which stated that the September
1941 opinion of the Assistant General Counsel correctly outlined current policies of the
Commission staff. Id at 2105.52.
The Commission did not require registration of all voluntary or contributory plans stating
that "no question will be raised with respect to the registration of participations in a volun-
tary contributory pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan that does not invest in the securities
of the employer company in an amount exceeding the company's contribution." Mundheim
& Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing
Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 809 (1964). Thus, by a "no-action" position, the
SEC "exempted" from registration those voluntary and contributory plans which did not
invest more than the employer's contributions in the securities of the employer.
31. Section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act requires registration of only those securities of-
fered for sale or sold. 15 U.S.C. 77e(1976). Section 17(a) of that act prohibits misleading
statements and omissions and fraudulant practices in connection with the sale or offer from
sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act and
rule lOb-5 prohibit misleading statements and omissions and fraudulant practices in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1977).
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securities.32 However, the question of whether expectancy interests in
mandatory, non-contributory pension plans were securities was never
addressed on its merits because of the Commission's "no sale" policy.
Indeed, the SEC had been criticized for this policy. 33 Perhaps in re-
sponse to this criticism, or in an attempt to broaden its jurisdiction, the
SEC has abruptly and formally abandoned its no sale position and now
insists that all employee interests in non-contributory, mandatory de-
fined benefit pension plans involve the sale of a security34 and are
32. See, e.g., Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pen-
sion and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 804-05 (1964).
33. The lower court in Daniel characterized the Commission's no-sale position as illogi-
cal. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541,553 (N.D. I11. 1976), affd,
561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
34. Judge Kirkland was the first federal judge to consider the precise question of whether
employee expectancy interests in mandatory, non-contributory pension plans are securities.
Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affid, 561 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). Several other district courts have
since addressed the issue. Eg., Weins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Hum v. Retirement Fund
Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus., 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976). In Weins
and Hum the plaintiffs were disappointed former employees who, as a condition of their
employment, had "participated" in mandatory non-contributory pension plans. In neither
case were the plaintiffs expectations met. Plantiff Hum's receipt of vested benefits termi-
nated when he was elected an officer of his local union. Plaintiff Weins failed to qualify for
a pension because of an involuntary break in service. In both cases it was held that plain-
tiffs' interests in their pension plans were not securities and, alternatively, that acquisition of
their interests did not constitute a sale of a security. Although Hum was decided several
months after the district court opinion in Daniel, the Hum court did not cite Daniel. In its
brief conclusions of law the court relied instead upon United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) in holding that no sale of any security had occurred. The court further held that
ERISA preempted the securities law with respect to disputes over pension benefits. In
Weins, Judge Hill specifically rejected the district court's rationale in Daniel, and was par-
ticularly unsympathetic toward expansion of the securities law to encompass interests in
pension plans. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal.
1977).
A third case, Robinson v. UMW Health & Retirement Funds, 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C.
1977), was a class action brought on behalf of surviving dependents of deceased miners. The
potential class members sought declaratory relief with respect to their right to health care
benefits under a union-sponsored health and retirement plan. Judge Gesell considered and
rejected the analysis of the lower court in Daniel, stating that the securities laws were not
meant to regulate such plans.
A fourth case, Cinnamon v. Brooks, No. 77-204 (C.D. Cal., filed 1977) involved a cross-
complaint by a former employee whose benefit expectations were not met. The cross-com-
plaint contained several counts, including one under the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties acts. On May 20, 1977 Judge Lydick dismissed the securities counts of the cross-
complaint.
Two other district courts have accepted Daniel's reasoning. Schlansky v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) was a class action filed on
behalf of present and former employees whose pension expectations were not met. Citing the
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therefore subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities acts. 5
The Commission changed its position on this issue in its amicus brief
before the court of appeals36 in Daniel v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.3 7 The original action in Daniel was an individual and class
action brought by a retired truckdriver who contended that, contrary to
his expectations and contrary to the representations of the defendants,
he had not received benefits under a mandatory, non-contributory pen-
sion plan in which his employer participated.
The defendants in Daniel were the pension trust fund, its trustees,
court of appeals' decision in Daniel, the court found that former employees' interests in a
single-employer, non-contributory, mandatory pension plan were securities and were thus
subject to the antifraud provision of the 1934 Exchange Act. The court dismissed the claim
for relief under § 17a of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), on the ground
that there is no private right of action thereunder. See note 20 supra.
In Assay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., No. 76-1 (N.D. Iowa, filed 1976) the court denied a
motion to dismiss the securities counts of a complaint filed on behalf of former employees
who did not receive their expected benefits under a single-employer, non-contributory,
mandatory pension plan. The court stated that plaintiffs' assertion ofjurisdiction under the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws was clearly not frivolous under the district court
opinion in Daniel.
35. According to the Commission, however, interests in mandatory, non-contributory
pension plans are exempted from the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act
under § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77a(2) (1976). Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission
as Amicus Curiae at 5, 31, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1977)(cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978)). The Commission has also exempted such
interests from the registration requirement of the 1934 Exchange Act by promulgating rule
12h-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-2 (1976). Since pension plans do not file registration statements
under the 1933 Securities Act or the 1934 Exchange Act, they are not required to file peri-
odic reports under § 13 or § 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)
(1976).
36. The response to the Commission's sudden change in position has been somewhat un-
favorable. Judge Tone, in his concurring opinion in Daniel commented:
In reaching this conclusion, I have found little comfort in the opinion expressed by
the SEC, as amicus curiae. Apparently for the first time ever, it now takes the position
in its brief before us that the employee's interest or expectancy in a plan such as this is
subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. The Commission has not
been as candid as we might have hoped in acknowledging and explaining its change in
position.
Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d at 1251 (Tone, J., concurring), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
In a case similar to Daniel, Judge Hill commented:
Now, we have the interesting phenomenon that defendant points out that for forty
years the SEC has said that these pension plan interests were not securities; but the SEC
may have changed its mind recently as a result of the Daniel case. But there is a quick
and easy answer to that supplied, I think, by the Supreme Court in Forman; and the
Supreme Court, I think, teaches us in the Forman opinion that the SEC position, past
or present, is of minimal importance, and especially of minimal importance when that
position has suddenly shifted after a long period in the other direction.
Weins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
96,005, at 91,519 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See note 14 supra.
37. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
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and the local and international unions to which Mr. Daniel belonged.38
The complaint contained several counts, the first two of which were
premised on violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act39 and
section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act4° and rule 10b-541 promulgated
thereunder. It also alleged breach of duty of fair representation under
section 9a of the National Labor Relations Act,4 2 violation of section
305(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,4 3 breach of fiduciary duty,
and fraud and deceit. The complaint sought reformation of the pen-
sion plan by deleting the alleged "arbitrary length and continuity re-
quirements of all vesting provisions," judgment equal to all pension
benefits unlawfully denied plaintiff and members of his class, and
judgment for amounts equal to pension trust funds "unlawfully di-
verted from their proper purposes." 4 On appeal from the denial of a
38. In addition, the complaint named three classes of defendants: "Teamster local unions
with pension funds similarly situated to Local 705, trustees of such pension funds and all
officers of locals with such pension funds." Id at 1225.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
40. Id § 78j(b).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
43. Id § 186(5).
44. Mr. Daniel could not recover his expected or promised pension under the securities
laws.
Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act permits the recovery only of "actual" dam-
ages, generally construed to mean a plaintiffs out-of-pocket loss, not the benefit of
what the plaintiff bargained for. Accordingly a pension beneficiary plaintiff might
well be confined to recovering the contributions to the pension, and not the pension
benefit itself, if recovery were permitted.
Memorandum to Chairman Williams of the SEC from the Office of the General Counsel of
the SEC (December 7, 1977), reprinted in 4 J. PENs. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 11, 16 (1978).
While the memorandum is correct in stating that there can be no recovery of the pension
benefit itself, it is incorrect in assuming that recovery can be had for the employer contribu-
tions. As explained in note 62 infra, the employer contributions are merely a funding mech-
anism designed to finance pension obligations. An employee has no interest whatsoever in
employer contributions in a non-contributory defined benefit plan.
Mr. Daniel's out-of-pocket costs are his opportunity costs--the costs he incurred in not
changing jobs. This opportunity cost could be considerably less (or more) than the amount
of employer contribution or the promised pension. In Mr. Daniel's case, his opportunity
costs may be zero. Mr. Daniel stated in his affidavit that had he known of the way in which
the pension plan vesting requirements would be interpreted, he would have sought other
employment with retirement benefits of the type he expected to receive under the Local 705
Plan. Had Mr. Daniel changed jobs in 1955, the year in which the Local 705 plan was
instituted, he would have received no past service credit in his new employer's pension plan.
Since prior to ERISA plans often required twenty years of employment prior to vesting, Mr.
Daniel may not have been eligible for any benefits in his new employer's plan when he
retired in December 1973. The relevant portions of Mr. Daniel's affidavit are discussed in
note 161 i.fra.
45. The complaint alleged that there have been unlawful diversions and investments of
trust funds; however, the Supreme Court has held that breaches of fiduciary duty are not
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motion to dismiss the securities counts of the complaint, with the sup-
port of the SEC as amicus, the court of appeals held that plaintiff, as a
purchaser of a security, had standing to maintain an action under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts.
46
Daniel presents a particularly good opportunity for examination of
the consequences of ad hoc judicial expansion of the securities laws,
since not long before the court's decision, Congress addressed the gen-
eral issue of pension reform on the assumption that employee interests
in pension plans were not subject to federal securities regulation.47
This article will contrast the results of this legislation with the results
implicit in the Daniel decision.
To make this comparison it is first necessary to survey the growth of
the private pension system and the accompanying growth of its regula-
actionable in private damage suits under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Accord, O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 1 96,034 (N.D. InI. 1977);
Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, [1978] PENS. REP. (BNA) D-1 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (beneficiaries of a
trust have no standing under § 10(b) to complain of breaches of fiduciary duty by the trust-
ees). But see Cartano, Rule Job-5 and ERJSA After the Daniel Case, 4 J. PENS. PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 183, 188 (1978).
46. In 1973 when Mr. Daniel retired and was denied pension benefits, ERISA had not
been enacted. Since the new legislation operates prospectively only, Mr. Daniel has no
claim for relief under it. However, the Daniel holding is not restricted to persons whose
benefits were denied prior to ERISA. The Daniel court viewed the antifraud sections of the
securities laws as complementary to ERISA, and held that the antifraud provisions apply to
interests in plans covered by ERISA. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
1223, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
47. Senator Williams recently stated:
At no time during the period of ERISA's development was it ever stated to me or, to the
best of my knowledge, to any other member of Congress that the Securities Acts' an-
tifraud provisions applied to noncontributory, involuntary pension plans. . . . Parties
and amii in Daniel, including the Commission, have devoted much argument to the
legislative history of ERISA, its predecessor labor law, the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act, the antifraud provisons of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, and the
amendment to section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act that was contained in the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970; and the record is devoid of any affirmative state-
ment by the SEC of the proposition it has supported in Daniel. . . . The relevant
legislative history demonstrates a focus on the registration provisons of the 1933 Act;
the antifraud provisions are rarely mentioned and if it is true that the Commission
never stated that the antifraud provisions did not apply as they have been held to apply
in Daniel, it is also true that the Commission never stated that they did apply. In over
40 years, there was no affirmative statement and, most importantly, no action that
would have put the Congress on notice.
The lack of notice is very important because, given the delicate balance Congress
sought to strike in ERISA, notice that the antifraud provisions were applicable to a fact
situation such as that in Daniel certainly would have been a matter worthy of legislative
consideration as, indeed, it has become a matter of legislative consideration since the
7th circuit decision.
Letter from Senator Williams to SEC Chairman Williams (Dec. 13, 1977), reprinted in 4 J.
PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 17, 18-19 (1978).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tion by the government. In so doing note must be taken of the per-
ceived inequities and abuses associated with the pension system and
the available means for rectifying them must be examined. Only then
can the implications of Daniel be assessed. While a comprehensive
history and analysis of these abuses and the "solutions" offered by the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)48 are beyond the
scope of this paper, it will be useful to focus briefly on funding prac-
tices, vesting and continuity of service rules, and participation and dis-
closure policies, all of which are relevant to the Daniel decision.49
III. THE GROWTH OF THE PENSION SYSTEM AND PENSION
REGULATION
A. The System
While formal pension plans have been in use in the United States
since 1875,50 striking growth in their use has occurred during the past
few decades. Originally pension plans offered employees annuity ben-
efits financed by the investment of employer contributions in govern-
ment bonds or similar fixed interest bearing securities.51 The character
of these investments began to change in the 1950's when General Mo-
tors instituted a new type of plan with an investment trust designed to
make diversified investments, particularly in equity securities. This was
a revolutionary development and within a year, 8,000 new plans were
written, each copying the General Motors diversified investment
trust.
5 2
Today pension plans cover at least one-half of the industrial work
force and represent a major source of investment capital.-3Many fac-
tors have contributed to their rapid growth.
48. A substantial portion of ERISA's provisions has been codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1381 (1976); the remainder has been codified in various sections of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.
49. For a comprehensive survey of ERISA, see Comment, The Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 539 (1975) [herein-
after cited as ERISA: Policies and Problems].
50. Historians generally agree that the first formal pension plan in the United States was
established in 1875 by the American Express Company. W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PEN-
SION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GREENOUGH & KING].
51. P. DRUCKER, Tim UNSEEN REVOLUTION 6 (1976).
52. Id.
53. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in Daniel v. International
Brotherhood Of Teamsters A Report To The Committee On Federal Regulation OfSecurites
From The Study Group of 1933 Act-General Subcommitteee On Daniel, Et Al. v. Interna-
tionalBrotherhood OfTeamsters, 32 Bus. LAW. 1925, 1930 n.1 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Daniel Study Group Repor].
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Pension plan growth has been stimulated by the federal government.
This has been accomplished primarily by the creation of certain statu-
tory tax advantages54 for qualifying plans. Under this system of pref-
erential tax treatment, taxes are deferred on employer contributions
and trust investment earnings, thus leaving untaxed significant accu-
mulations of wealth. The federal judiciary contributed its encourage-
ment to pension growth by holding that employee benefit plans were
mandatory subjects for collective bargaining.55 Additional federal
nourishment was provided during World War II and the Korean Con-
flict with the imposition of wage controls and excess profits taxes, and
with the exemption from wage controls of indirect increases in em-
ployee compensation through pension and other benefit plans.
5 6
Pension plans are perceived to be useful to the various interest
groups in industrial employment.5 They provide employers with a
means of encouraging long-term employment, reducing expensive em-
ployee turnover and inducing the retirement of older, highly paid em-
ployees without incurring the ill will of the labor force. For employees
and unions, the pension promises retirement security. 8
54. The employer receives an immediate deduction for the contribution and the tax on
the contributions and earnings is deferred until distribution to the recipient. I.R.C. §§ 401-
404,501(a). For a thorough review of the taxation of qualified plans, see M. CANAN, QuAL-
IFIED RETIREMENT PLANS (1977).
55. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949).
56. M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10, 197-98 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as BERNSTEIN].
57. For a discussion of the objectives of unions, employers and employees in utilizing
pension plans, see id. at 9-14. The author questions whether pension plans fulfill these
objectives.
58. Some have maintained that pensions are aggregate deferred wages for each year of
employment. Thus the decision to ratify a collective bargaining agreement of which a pen-
sion plan is a part becomes an investment decision by employees who must decide whether
to take a part of their present wages and invest in pension benefits. Under this analysis, it is
then concluded that when employees fail to qualify for pensions, they "forfeit" their em-
ployer contributions (the deferred wages). The underlying assumption is that, in the ab-
sence of a pension plan, employer contributions would go directly into the paychecks of
present employees.
While this assumption and the mode of analysis described do make pension plans appear
to be similar to "securities" traditionally regulated under securities law, they do not comport
with the realities of non-contributory, defined benefit pension plans which typically require
lengthy employment periods before any right to receive benefits vests. The Supreme Court
recently had occasion to examine the nature of such plans and it specifically rejected the
assumption that benefits are aggregate deferred wages for each year of employment.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581 (1977), the Court held that § 9 of the
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b), subsequently recodified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 2021(b)(2) (1976), requires an employer to give an employee pension credit for his period
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Thus pension plans have enjoyed tremendous popularity. By 1973
pension plans covered approximately thirty million employees. The to-
tal asset value of these plans was estimated at 150 billion dollars in
1973 and has been projected to exceed 250 billion dollars by 1980. 59
Because of the wide variety of economic conditions prevailing in dif-
ferent industries, several types of pension plans were developed. A
"multi-employer" plan, covering the employees of financially unre-
lated employers, is generally collectively bargained and provides for
transfer of pension credits among participating employers. These
plans are often industrywide in operation and may be local, regional or
national in scope. Multi-employer plans are usually found in indus-
tries characterized by numerous small employers with a high rate of
business failure. In such an environment, this type of plan provides
employees with pension benefits not otherwise available. For small
employers, the multi-employer plan provides the economies of scale
associated with the administration of a large plan and the standardiza-
tion of pension costs among competing employers. Some employers
use "single-employer plans," which may cover a few to several hundred
thousand employees. Such plans may be collectively bargained or
may be instituted unilaterally by an employer. Single-employer plans
account for a substantial majority of private pension plans and employ-
ees covered by such plans.6°
The employer's obligation under multi- or single-employer plans
may be to make specified contributions, or to make whatever contribu-
tions are necessary to produce specified benefits. The former is re-
ferred to as a "defined contribution" plan and the latter as a "defined
benefit" plan.6 Defined contribution plans, which include profit shar-
of military service. In reaching this conclusion, the Court decided that the pension involved
was a reward for length of service:
Other aspects of pension plans like the one established by petitioner suggest that the
"true nature" of the pension payment is a reward for length of service. The most sig-
nificant factor pointing to this conclusion is the lengthy period required for pension
rights to vest in the employee. It is difficult to maintain that a pension increment is
deferred compensation for a year of actual service when it is only thepassage ofyears in
the same company's employ, and not the serice rendered, that entitles the employee to that
increment.
Id at 593 (emphasis added).
59. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, discussed in Daniel Study Group Report,
supra note 53.
60. D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 78-79 (3d ed. 1975).
61. The defined benefit may depend upon earnings or length of service. The benefit
payable is generally expressed in one of the following ways: (1) a flat amount (unrelated to
earnings or service); (2) a percentage of an employee's earnings (dependent on earnings,
unrelated to service); (3) a flat amount per year of service (unrelated to earnings, dependent
on service); or (4) a percentage of each year's earnings (dependent on earnings and service).
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ing, certain pension and other retirement plans, do not produce a pre-
determined level of benefits, but rather a level of benefits dependent on
the value of the plan assets.62
The Daniel plan is typical of most defined benefit pension plans; em-
ployee participation occurs automatically as a conditon of employment
and only employers contribute to the plan trust fund. Such plans are
referred to as mandatory, non-contributory defined benefit plans. Un-
less otherwise indicated, this article will focus on this type of plan.
B. Pension Regulation Be/ore ERIS4
For many years the most significant, though indirect, mechanism for
pension regulation has been the tax law. In order to qualify for advan-
tageous tax treatment permitting deferment of tax on employer contri-
butions to the trust as well as on the trust earnings,63 a pension plan
had to satisfy certain criteria. Among other things, employers were re-
quired to place their contributions in an irrevocable trust for the benefit
of all employees; "qualified" plans could not discriminate in favor of
shareholder-employees or management personnel; and employers werc
required to finance plan obligations with advance funding."4 While
J. MELONE & E. ALLEN, JR., PENSION PLANNING 37 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MELONE & ALLEN].
62. Employees have no interest or expectancy in their employers' contributions to a non-
contributory defined benefit plan fund. The amount of pension benefits payable to any em-
ployee under such a plan does not depend upon the amount contributed to the fund by any
employer on the employee's behalf, nor does it depend upon the earnings on such contribu-
tions. If, upon satisfaction of the conditions for payment of a pension, the employer contri-
butions together with accumulated earnings thereon exceed the defined benefit, the
employee is entitled only to the defined benefit, and nothing more. Conversely, if the em-
ployer contributions and accumulated earnings are less than the defined benefit, an em-
ployee satisfying all the conditions for payment is entitled to the full amount of the defined
benefit.
Employer contributions made over the years with respect to particular employees are
merely an advance funding mechanism designed to provide for payment of future pension
obligations. Absent ERISA's new funding requirements and the advantages associated with
qualified pension plans, a defined benefit pension could be financed in other ways.
Thus, the court in Daniel seems to have erred in stating that an employee who fails to
qualify for a pension has forfeited his interest in his employer's contributions and the earn-
ings thereon. Since contributions are merely an advance funding mechanism, it is illogical
to hold that a particular employee has an "interest" in the contributions. While the court's
analysis may have merit with reference to a defined contribution plan, it has no such merit
when applied to a defined benefit plan.
63. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
64. Employer contributions were only required to be made in the amount necessary to
cover current costs and interest on unfunded past service obligations. There was no require-
ment that employers fund these past service obligations. For a discussion of the taxation of
qualified plans prior to ERISA, see ERSA: Policies and Problems, supra note 49, at 5 89-95.
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there was no law compelling plans to become "qualified," the promise
of "tax-free" earnings provided sufficient incentive for employers and
unions to qualify their plans. 5
While the National Labor Relations Act 66 and the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act67 contain some provisions relating
to the operation of certain joint union and management pension plans,
the first serious attempt at direct pension regulation was the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958.68 This legislation was sup-
posed to protect plan participants by requiring disclosure of certain
financial and other information to the Secretary of Labor and, upon
request, to plan participants. A later amendment attempted to deal with
unlawful diversion of pension assets by making such activity a federal
crime and granting the Secretary of Labor limited regulatory authority
in this regard.69
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was not generally re-
garded as effective in protecting participating employees or pension as-
sets.70 What many perceived as serious inequities in the pension
system continued in spite of the several federal statutes relating to pen-
sions. Studies of private pension plans revealed that many plans re-
quired extended (and to some persons "onerous") periods of service
before any vesting of benefits occurred.7 It was also evident that
many plans had serious funding problems; sometimes the assets were
insufficient to meet accrued liabilities upon plan termination.72 Fund-
ing problems were compounded by administrative and investment
65. For a discussion of non-qualified plans and the circumstances in which they may be
more advantageous than qualified plans, see M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS
16-61 (1977).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976).
67. Id §§ 401-531.
68. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-
309 (1970) (repealed by ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1976)).
69. Id. § 308(a) (repealed by ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (1976)).
70. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d CONG. lST Sans. 4 (1973), reprintedin SEN. COMM. ON LABOR
AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEsS., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIRE ENT INcoME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 1599 (Comm. Print 1976) [the Legislative
History is hereinafter cited as I, H or III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See also GREENOUGH &
KING, supra note 50, at 66.
71. These vesting and service requirements are discussed at notes 97-98 infra and accom-
panying text.
72. A 1970 survey of plans which covered 7.1 million workers showed that one-third of
the plans surveyed reported a ratio of assets to accrued liabilities of 50% or less; 7% reported
a ratio of 25% or less. ERSAI: Policies and Problems, supra note 49, at 548 n.61. Congres-
sional concern with funding is shown in ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976) which
states in pertinent part: "The Congress finds. . . that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to
pay promised benefits may be endangered .... " It has been suggdsted that pension plans
are in worse financial condition than is generally reported. See note 88 infra.
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abuses by pension trustees which further diminished plan assets.73
Often these problems were further complicated by the lack of meaning-
ful disclosure to plan participants who, ignorant of vesting and con-
tinuity of service requirements, placed unjustified reliance on future
pension benefits which never materialized.74
C. ERISA
In addressing the issue of pension reform in the proceedings which
eventuated in ERISA, Congress had two conflicting goals: it wanted to
secure the receipt of employee pension benefits and, at the same time,
conserve the private pension system. It was obviously disturbed by the
high percentage of employees who would never receive any benefits
under the pension plans in which they were participating.75 Senator
73. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971) (involving alleged
conduct of trustees of the United Mine Workers of America pension trust).
74. See notes 107-08 infra and accompanying text.
75. ERISA's legislative history abounds with parades of perceived horribles--the names
and stories of persons like John Daniel who, after working many years for the same em-
ployer and after retirement or plan termination, found their pension expectations unmet.
For example, Senator Williams remarked:
While there can be no doubt that our private pension system has well served the needs
of many workers, our study found that for countless others, the expectation of retire-
ment benefits has proven to be built on sand.
This was the experience, for example of Stephen Duane, who worked for 32 years at
an A. & P. warehouse in Jersey City.
Because his warehouse was shutdown [sic ]when Mr. Duane was 4 years short of the
company's minimum pension age, he received no retirement benefits whatever despite
his long years of service.
A similar experience was recounted by Murray Finkelstein, a New York shoe sales-
man.
After 20 years in his retirement plan, he lost all his pension rights at age 60 when the
Andrew Geller shoe store, at which he worked, went out of business.
The system also failed for Iris Kweck whose employment by Anaconda was termi-
nated after 30 years of service because of a shutdown of its Detroit billing office.
At age 48, she lost all future pension rights.
These are but a few of the numerous examples brought to the attention of our com-
mittee.
119 CONG. REc. 30003 (1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 1599.
Senator Bentsen remarked:
We must not forget that the termination of a retirement plan is much more than a
statistic compiled for Government charts. It is much more than a list of numbers or a
series of percentages. As the victims of pension plan terminations can easily attest, a
termination represents a great personal tragedy.
It was certainly a real tragedy for the retired worker in Minnesota who learned that
he might lose his vested pension because his former employer was about to discontinue
the retirement plan. This retired worker said:
"If I get a cut in my pension, I don't know what I will do. My wife has been men-
tally ill for 14 years and had 45 shock treatments and I am doctoring for cancer since
1954. So you can see my health and my wife's are not too good. Her medicine for a
year runs over $500 not including mine, so we need all the pension fund we can get."
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Hartke remarked: "Today over 34 million working men and women
are subject to great inequities in the private pension systems. These in-
equities cause the intolerable situation in which only one out of ten
employees enrolled in pension plans will ever receive benefits."76 Sen-
ator Jackson's concern was also evident:
At present, there are 34 million workers participating in private pension
plans. Undoubtedly, most of these workers are planning and relying on
their pension plans to provide them with a substantial part of their retire-
ment income. And yet, the facts are at present that only 22 percent of
American workers receive all of the pension benefits which they have
earned and which are rightfully theirs. I believe that these statistics are
shocking and scandalous. It is just not right for the middle or low-in-
come worker, who has made a productive contribution to his community
all of his working life, to be cheated out of his pension and left out in the
cold in his retirement.17
But while Congress wanted to protect pension benefits, 8 it was also
concerned that federal regulation might eliminate or significantly re-
duce the number of private pension plans. The attempt to balance these
competing objectives in ERISA is reflected in the following excerpt
from a House Ways and Means Committee Report on the proposed
legislation:
[T]he committee has been mindful of the need to construct the new re-
quirements so that they will provide meaningful improvement in the vari-
ous problem areas noted under the present law. At the same time, the
committee is aware that under our voluntary pension system, the cost of
financing pension plans is an important factor in determining whether
any particular retirement plan will be adopted and in determining the
benefit levels if a plan is adopted, and that unduly large increases in costs
The experience of Olaf Anderson of Philadelphia provides another illustration. Af-
ter working for the same company for 48 years, Mr. Anderson retired in 1970 and began
to receive a pension of $100 a month. However, the company pension plan was termi-
nated in 1971, and Mr. Anderson now receives no pension at all. It is interesting to
note that this company provided its employees with a booklet describing the pension.
The booklet informed the employees:
"You can look forward to retirement with peace of mind knowing under the plan
there will be a pension check in the mail to you from the company every month for
life."
In light of such occurrences, it is not difficult to understand why so many Americans
look at the private retirement system as a series of broken promises.
120 CONG. Rc. 29950 (1974), reprintedin III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 4793-
94.
76. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP.
No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1973) (additional views of Mr. Hartke), reprinted in I
LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 1218.
77. 119 CONG. Rc. 29839 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at
1267.
78. See ERISA § 2(b)-(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c) (1976).
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could impede the growth and improvement of the private retirement sys-
tem. For this reason, in the case of those requirements which add to the
cost of financing retirement plans, the committee has sought to adopt pro-
visions which strike a balance between providing meaningful reform and
keeping costs within reasonable limits.
7 9
An understanding of these problems and the solutions attempted by
ERISA is necessary in order to analyze the issues involved in Daniel.
1. Funding Practices
Since pension plans are a means of encouraging long-term employ-
ment and also retirement of older, highly paid workers, plans generally
require employees to reach a specified retirement age and complete a
long employment period before qualifying for benefits.80 When a plan
is initially adopted many older employees would never be able to com-
plete the lengthy employment term required for pension eligibility un-
less they received credit for their pre-plan employment. Consequently,
at adoption most plans credit present employees with their past service,
and those employees thereby become eligible for full retirement bene-
fits a relatively short time after the plan is adopted. Therefore, under
any defined benefit plan the annual pension benefit payout increases
rapidly for the first several years of plan operation as more employees
are added to the benefit drawing group than are removed by death.
Generally, it will take a substantial time period for the size of the re-
tirement group and the annual pension benefit payout to stabilize."'
Since no funds have been set aside for the retirement of those older
workers receiving past service credit, most defined benefit pension
plans have large unfunded past service obligations. In addition, there is
considerable doubt that, under many plans, present service costs are
adequately funded. 2
One of the most serious risks to the receipt of pension benefits is the
termination of a pension plan before full funding is achieved. Plans
typically provide that the employer is not liable if plan assets prove
insufficient to pay liabilities.83 Thus, prior to ERISA, when an un-
79. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PrVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP.
No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprintedin H LEGISLATIVE IsTORY, supra
note 70, at 3134-35.
80. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
81. MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 61, at 65-66.
82. For a discussion of underfunded plans and liabilities, see note 72 supra and note 88
infra.
83. BERNsT-N, supra note 56, at 34. Some collectively bargained plans provide that "the
employer is liable for whatever contributions were agreed upon." Id
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derfunded pension plan was terminated, at least some employees did
not receive their full pension benefits.
A good illustration of the vulnerability of pension benefits to prema-
ture plan termination is provided by the Studebaker experience. In
1964, Studebaker closed its South Bend, Indiana plant and terminated
its underfunded pension plan. While a limited number of Studebaker
employees received their full pension benefits, a substantial portion of
those with vested benefits received only fifteen cents on the dollar;
others received nothing.84
Before ERISA there were no mandatory funding requirements for
pension plans and a variety of mechanisms were in use. Some plans
were entirely unfunded with employers making current disbursements
to pay pension obligations as they became due. Partially or fully
funded plans were financed by "terminal" or "advance" funding.
Under terminal funding, when a retiring employee became eligible for
pension benefits, the employer set aside a lump sum from which the
promised monthly benefits were paid. Since plans using terminal or
current disbursement financing could not obtain qualified status, these
types of financing were not often used."5 Advance funding, now re-
quired by ERISA, has always been the most common type of plan fi-
nancing, since it was the only financing which permitted plan
qualification prior to ERISA. The employer periodically sets aside
funds prior to employee retirement. However, the funds are not neces-
sarily earmarked for particular employees. While employer contribu-
tions may be used to purchase annuity type insurance policies,
contributions are most frequently placed in a trust fund from which
pension obligations are paid as they become due. 6 Even qualified
plans utilizing advance funding were not required to fund past service
obligations, 7 however, and many pension plans had, and still have to-
day, huge unfunded past service obligations.88
84. 120 CONo. REc. 29950 (1974) (Remarks of Senator Bentsen), reprinted in II LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 4793.
85. For a discussion and comparison of the various types of financing mechanisms in use
before ERISA, see MELONE & ALLEN, supra note 61, at 69-80.
86. Id at 74.
87. See note 64 supra.
88. See generally Ehrbar, Those Pension Plans are Even Weaker than You Think, FoR-
TuNE, Nov. 1977, at 104. Ehrbar suggests that pension liabilities are "ridiculously under-
stated." He points out that legitimate actuarial methods produce widely differing results
and suggests that even under ERISA the accounting and actuarial treatment of pension
liabilities is a "masterpiece of obfuscation" particularly with respect to the latitude permitted
actuaries in choosing wage and interest assumptions. In determining plan costs and liabili-
ties and the appropriate level of employer contribution under a defined benefit plan, actua-
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Congress was concerned with this underfunding and was determined
to encourage and eventually to require full funding of all pension obli-
gations.8 9 It did not do so by mandating immediate funding of past
service obligations. The cost to the employer of such a requirement
would have been so high as to jeopardize the continuation of existing
plans and to discourage the inclusion of past service credits in new
plans.90 Instead ERISA requires gradual amortization of past service
obligations.91 Additional provisions discourage underfunding of pen-
sion plans.
9 2
Even under the new funding rules, however, it will be many years
before most plans become fully funded. In order to protect employee
benefits during this interim period, ERISA provides for termination
insurance underwritten by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). 93 Upon plan termination, this insurance guarantees, with
ries work with employers in estimating the rate of return at which plan assets will be
invested (the interest assumption) and the rate at which wages will grow (the wage assump-
tion). Id at 107. Small errors in either assumption produce substantial differences in the
calculation of plan costs and liabilities. The author cites Professor Winklevoss of Wharton
who states that on the average, an increase of 1% in the interest assumption will cause a 25%
reduction in plan expenses and liabilities. Likewise a 1% reduction in the wage assumption
will produce a 13% reduction in the calculation of expenses and liabilities. Id Moreover,
Ehrbar estimates that the adoption of more realistic assumptions would nearly double cor-
porate pension liabilities and quintuple unfunded liabilities. Id at 107-08.
89. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976).
90. Generally, the 30-year amortization requirements initially add only moderately to
an employer's funding cost under present law. This is true because under present law
interest on unfunded accrued past service liabilities (which accounts for the bulk of the
level amortization payments required under the bill in the early years) must be contrib-
uted to a qualified pension plan. Therefore, your committee believes that 30-year
amortization will not hamper an employer in starting a new plan, or in adding plan
amendments, that includes past service liabilities. Similarly, the 40-year amortization
will not unduly increase present costs of an employer with an existing plan.
HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, PRIVATE PENSION TAX REFORM, H.R. REP. No. 93-
779, 93d CONG., 2d Sass. 76-77 (1974), reprintedin II LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, Supra note 70,
at 2665-66.
91. Past service costs for existing plans and for all multi-employer plans must be amor-
tized within 40 years. ERISA § 302(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b)(2)(B) (1976). For certain
new plans a 30 year amortization is required. Id However, under certain circumstances the
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant employers variances or waivers from the
minimum funding standards if satisfaction of the standards would result in substantial busi-
ness hardship. Id § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 1083 (1976).
92. See, eg., ERISA § 1013(c)(1), I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (higher maximum tax deduction
permitted employers for contributions above the minimum standard); ERISA §§ 501-502, §
1013(b), I.R.C. § 4971 (penalties and taxes for funding deficiencies); ERISA §§ 3041-3042,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1242 (1976) (government regulation of actuaries through establishment of
Joint Board of Actuaries). For a thorough discussion of funding restrictions, see ERIS.4:
Policies and Problems, supra note 49, at 589-606.
93. ERISA § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976) establishes within the Department of Labor a
corporate body known as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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some limitations, the payment to employees of all vested benefits paya-
ble under defined benefit plans." The insurance is to be paid for in
part by compulsory annual fixed premiums from employers and also
by payments from employers who terminate underfunded plans.95
Such an employer is contingently liable, up to thirty percent of the em-
ployer's net worth, for any payments made by PBGC because of the
termination of a plan in which the employer participated. 6
2. Vesting and Continuity of Service Requirements
Private pension plans generally required long periods of continuous
employment in order to qualify for pension benefits at normal retire-
ment age. Some plans failed to provide for any pre-retirement vesting
of benefits and employees whose employment terminated prior to nor-
mal retirement frequently lost their right to a pension.97  Often a short
94. ERISA states that, subject to certain limitations, the PBGC shall guarantee payment
of all non-forfeitable basic benefits payable under certain qualified single-employer defined
benefit plans and amendments thereto which have been in effect for a 5 year period. ERISA
§ 4022(a), (b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (a), (b)(1) (1976). Benefits payable under plans or
amendments which have been in effect less than 5 years are partially guaranteed in propor-
tion to the amount of time they have been in effect. Id § 4022(b)(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8)
(1976). Benefits which become nonforfeitable solely because of plan termination are not
guaranteed, nor are benefits under a plan which is terminated for the purpose of obtaining
the payment of benefits by the PBGC. Id § 4022(a), (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a), (c) (1976).
While the compulsory insurance of non forfeitable benefits payable under single-employer
plans is already in effect, the mandatory insurance of benefits payable under multi-employer
plans is deferred until July 1, 1979. Id. § 4082(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b) (1976). For a more
detailed discussion of plan termination insurance and employers' contingent liability, see
EPRISA: Policies and Problems, supra note 49, at 607-21.
95. ERISA § 4005(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(1) (1976). The compulsory benefit insurance
may involve a significant redistribution of wealth between the shareholders and employee
beneficiaries of financially weak employers with financially troubled pension plans and the
shareholders and employees of financially strong employers with fully funded pension plans.
See Ehrbar, Those Pension Plans are Even Weaker than You Think, FORTUNE, Nov. 1977, at
110-11.
96. ERISA §§ 4062, 4064, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1364 (1976). The PBGC is instructed to
offer employers insurance against this contingent liability. Id § 4023, 29 U.S.C. § 1323
(1976). See note 127 infra.
97. Studies have revealed that in 1969 13% of the employees covered by private single-
employer retirement plans and 49% of the employees covered by private multi-employer
retirement plans (comprising 23% of the employees covered by private retirement plans)
were under plans with no provision for pre-retirement vesting. The remaining employees
were under plans which made some provision for pre-retirement vesting: (1) 1% were cov-
ered by plans providing for vesting after 5 years of service; (2) 45% were covered by plans
providing for full or graded vesting after 10 years of service; (3) 39% were covered by plans
providing for vesting after 15 years of service; and (4) 3% were covered by plans providing
for vesting after more than 20 years of service. GREENOUGH & KING, supra note 50, at 165.
These studies reveal a substantial improvement over the more stringent service and vest-
ing provisions found in plans in the 1950's when 50% of employees covered by private pen-
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interruption in employment caused a period of employment to be ex-
cluded from consideration in determining benefit eligibility.98
The Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund Pension Plan (Local 705 Plan) contained many restrictions
of this type. At the time Mr. Daniel applied for retirement benefits in
December of 1973, the Local 705 Plan required beneficiaries to have
completed twenty consecutive, uninterrupted years of employment im-
mediately preceding retirement. Any short lay-off or break in service
prior to January 1970 caused earlier employment to be disregarded in
the calculation of the twenty consecutive years. 99
Daniel highlights the effect of such rigorous eligibility requirements.
Mr. Daniel was sixty-three years old when he retired with impaired
vision after twenty-two and one-half years of employment with em-
ployers who participated in the Local 705 Plan. He was declared ineli-
gible for benefits because of an involuntary four month lay-off in his
ninth year of employment.
During the Congressional debates on ERISA, Senator Bentsen may
well have been using the twenty-year vesting requirement of the Local
705 Plan as an example of the need for minimum vesting standards.
Another example of unreasonable vesting requirements involves the
participants of a union-administered pension plan in Chicago. Each lo-
cal within this union administers its own pension plan. Under the terms
of these plans a worker must remain within the same local for 20 years in
order to acquire any vested rights. Sometimes a slight shift in
jobs-perhaps from the loading docks to the weighing station-involves a
shift in union locals and a complete loss of all pension rights for an em-
ployee with less than 20 years on the first job.
These are only a few examples of the way countless numbers of Ameri-
can working men and women have been tragically victimized by unrea-
sonable vesting provisions in their pension plans.
Such tragic losses of pension benefits will be prevented in the future
when this pension legislation goes into effect. Under this bill, the em-
sion plans were under plans with no provision for pre-retirement vesting. An excellent
description of the vesting and service requirements of private retirement plans in the 1950's
may be found in BEmsTEIN, supra note 56, at 20-32.
It should be noted that vesting statistics do not take into account the fact that under multi-
employer plans an employee does not lose his prior employment credit when he changes
jobs and works for another employer who participates in the plan. Id at 25.
98. BERNSTEIN, supra note 56, at 21.
99. The Local 705 Plan has been liberalized to permit employees to undergo two involun-
tary breaks in service (after January 1970) under certain specified circumstances. 1973 Lo-
cal 705 Pension Plan Booklet 4 (Jan. 1973). But this modification was not designed to
benefit employees such as Mr. Daniel who have already received advantageous treatment
under the past service credit provisions of the plan.
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ployer or union running the plan has the option of meeting one of three
minimum vesting formulas."
l°
ERISA includes minimum vesting standards which may be achieved
under three alternate vesting schedules, all of which encourage early
vesting.10 1 If the Local 705 Plan had included any of these vesting
schedules, Mr. Daniers pension would have vested prior to his retire-
ment. In addition, had the Local 705 Plan contained the type of break
in service provision mandated by ERISA, Mr. Daniel's short lay-off
would not have caused his long prior employment to be disregarded. 0 2
3. Participation
Another problem closely associated with the prolonged vesting re-
quirements is that of participation standards. An employee's entry or
participation in a pension plan is generally governed by age and length
of employment. Prior to ERISA it was common practice to exclude
young employees from participation until they had completed long pe-
riods of employment.103 The only governmental regulation of partici-
pation was a requirement that, in order to qualify for preferential tax
treatment, a plan could not exclude employees who had worked for
more than five years. 1°4
ERISA's new participation requirements reflect an attempt to strike
a balance between encouraging early employee participation and mini-
mizing the high cost factors associated with permissive participation
provisions. With minor exceptions, 05 ERISA now mandates em-
100. 120 CONG. REc. 29950 (1974), reprintedin III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70,
at 4792.
101. ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976).
102. Under ERISA, existing plans may disregard years of service prior to ERISA which
would have been disregarded under the plan's break in service rules in effect before ERISA.
Subject to this and a few relatively minor exceptions, the general rule is that all employment
years during the term of the pension plan in which an employee completes 1000 hours of
service must be counted for purposes of vesting. Id § 203(b)(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(I)-
(2) (1976). A 1 year break in service only occurs when an employee fails to complete more
than 500 hours of service in any consecutive 12 month period. Id § 203(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(b)(3)(A) (1976). in only a limited number of situations are plans permitted to disre-
gard an employment year prior to a 1 year break in service. For a more detailed discussion
of the break in service requirements, see ERJSA: Policies and Problens, supra note 49, at
576-78.
103. Such a requirement excludes high-turnover employees from participation and
thereby avoids the administrative expenses related to bringing them into a plan as partici-
pants. D. MCGILL, FuNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 82 (3d ed. 1975).
104. lIt. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 401(a)(3)(A), 68 Stat. 730 (now I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)).
105. E.g., ERISA § 202(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B) (1976) (permits defined bene-
fit plans to exclude from participation older employees who begin work within 5 years of
normal retirement age under the plan); id § 202(a)(1)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2)(B)(i)
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ployee participation after an employee reaches age twenty five and
completes one year of employment.
1 0 6
4. Disclosure
Before the enactment of ERISA, there was concern over possible in-
adequacies in the disclosure of pension plan provisions to employ-
ees."07 A purported serious deficiency in the reporting system
established by the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was that
disclosure was made only to the Secretary of Labor. Information was
available to plan participants only upon request.
10 8
ERISA repeals the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act'°gand
substitutes a system of prescribed disclosures to plan participants. In
addition, ERISA requires comprehensive reporting to the Secretary of
Labor. Participants and beneficiaries must each be furnished with a
comprehensive summary of the pension plan, written in a manner
designed to be understood by average participants and reasonably cal-
culated to advise them of their rights and obligations under the plan.110
Among other things, the summary must describe the participation and
vesting requirements and the circumstances likely to result in ineligibil-
ity or loss of benefits."11 A description of the claim and redress proce-
dures for denied claims must also be included. 2 A summary must be
furnished shortly after participation or benefit payments begin. Fur-
ther summaries are to be furnished after material modifications are
made to the plan and at five- or ten-year intervals.' 13 Each year par-
ticipants and beneficiaries must also be furnished certain financial in-
formation concerning plan assets, including a balance sheet and a
(1976) (permits plans which provide for 100% vesting after not more than 3 years of service
to exclude employees from participation until they are 25 years of age and have completed 3
years of service).
106. Id § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A)(1976). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the participation standards, see ERIS4: Policies andProblems, supra note 49, at 566-
71.
107. Id § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The Congress finds
that... owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning
their operation, it is desirable and in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ...
that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, oper-
ation, and administration of such plans. .. ."
108. 29 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970) (repealed by ERISA § 111(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (1976)).
109. Id However, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act remains in effect for
certain transactions occurring prior to January 1, 1975.
110. ERISA §§ 101(a), 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1022(a)(1) (1976).
111. Id § 102(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1976).
112. Id
113. Id § 104(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1976).
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schedule of receipts and disbursements. 14
In addition to the above information, a participant may request other
information, including a written statement from the plan administrator
of the total benefits accrued, the earliest date when vesting will occur,
and the nonforfeitable amount, if any, of any monthly pension benefits
available at normal retirement age.'15  Participants and beneficiaries
may also demand a copy of the annual report required to be filed with
the Secretary of Labor." 6 This report contains detailed information
and financial data and must be certified by a public accountant and an
actuary."
7
The elaborate reporting and disclosure requirements of ERISA are
intended to complement the substantive protections afforded employ-
ees by the new vesting and participation standards. The idea is that
informed employees can better enforce "the new rights ERISA creates
for them. Equally important is the probability that meaningful com-
munication of pension information will discourage employees from
placing unjustified reliance upon receipt of future benefits.
IV. SHOULD THE FEDERAL SECUiuTIES LAWS BE APPLIED TO
PENSION PLANS?
There are, of course, important political questions raised whenever
courts, rather than legislatures, expand existing law to the extent that
this was done in Daniel. However, the focus of this article is on the
question of whether Daniel's expansion of the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws is likely to produce benefits that exceed their costs.
A. The Costs of Pension Regulation and Congressional Concern with
Them
ERISA and its legislative history show clearly that Congress was
concerned with the cost of pension regulation.118 The careful consid-
eration of the costs imposed by the new vesting rules and the refusal to
apply the new vesting and break in service requirements retroactively
114. Id §§ 103(b)(3)(A)-(B), 104(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023(b)(3)(A)-(B), 1024(b)(3) (1976).
115. Id § 105(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (1976).
116. Id § 104(a), (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a), (b)(4) (1976).
117. Id § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (1976).
118. Eg., Congress considered the study of the National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness which analyzed the impact of the proposed legislation on small businesses. It was
estimated that the new funding, vesting and participation requirements would impose the
following additional costs on small employers if current benefit levels were not reduced:
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are obvious examples." 9 ERISA also permits plans to exclude certain
younger and older employees from particiption, thereby relieving em-
NEW REQUIREMENTS ANNUAL INCREASE IN
UNDER ERISA EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTION
Vesting standards $ 720,000,000
Funding requirements 498,000,000
Participation standards 5,000,000,000
120 CONG. REc. 4311 (1974), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 3460.
A study of the cost of mandatory vesting provisions included in a report of the Senate
Finance Committee estimated that the new vesting standards would increase present plan
costs by 0 to 58%, depending on the liberality of the pre-ERISA vesting provisions in ex-
isting plans.
ESTIMATED RANGE OF INCREASE IN PENSION PLAN COSTS UNDER
REQUIREMENT FOR MINIMUM VESTING ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE
Present Present Present
vesting: vesting: vesting: All
None Moderate Liberal2  plans
Percentage of pension plan
members covered under
such plans .............. 23 56 21 100
Range of present plan cost
as a percent of payroll ... 1.8-11.2 2.2-12.5 2.2-12:7 1.8-12.7
Range of increase in cost
under committee vesting
requirement:
As a percent of payroll .2-1.5 .1-.2 0-.l 0-1.5
As a percent of present
plan cost ............. 5-58 1-8 0-3 0-58
1 Plan provides some vesting, but less liberal than full vesting after 10 years of service.
2 Plan provides full vesting after 10 years service or less, with no age requirement.
Source: "Summary of Report, Study of the Cost of Mandatory Vesting Provisions Pre-
pared for the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation," by Donald S. Grubbs,
Jr., July 30, 1973.
S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ,
supra note 70, at 1089.
119. The general rule is that plans subject to ERISA must give vesting credit for pre-
ERISA employment. However plans may disregard years of service prior to ERISA which
"would have been disregarded under the rules of the plan with regard to breaks in service, as
in effect on the applicable date." ERISA § 203(b)(1)(F), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1)(F) (1976).
Also, plans need not give vesting credit for certain pre-ERISA employment of employees
who do not complete 3 years of employment after December 31, 1970. ERISA §
203(b)(1)(E), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(1)(E) (1976). In commenting on the latter provision Rep-
resentative Ullman stated: "The purpose of the provisions is to avoid imposing on plans very
heavy costs for providing retroactive vesting for employees who have already terminated
their service. This might jeopardize benefits for employees still covered under the plan and
could involve very serious recordkeeping problems." 120 CONG. Rc. 29199 (1974), re-
printed in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 4675.
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ployers of the high costs associated with their inclusion. 120  In addition,
ERISA itself provides for waivers and variances of some requirements
on the basis of cost considerations. 121 This concern with costs was pre-
mised on the belief that employers would create or maintain fewer pen-
sion plans and would reduce pension benefits as their costs increased.
Implicit in ERISA, however, is the judgment that it is socially desira-
ble to protect some level of benefits for employees participating in the
various pension plans. 122 There is obviously a trade-off between those
benefits which Congress sought to assure through ERISA and the costs
which Congress knowingly imposed upon the system in adopting ER-
ISA. 123  While the exact weight accorded to various costs and benefits
cannot be specified precisely, it appears that Congress was willing to
accept a sharp decline in the number of extant plans as the price of
increasing the welfare of the beneficiaries of the remaining plans. If
Congress was not, indeed, willing to make that trade-off, then it appar-
ently misjudged the extent and impact of the costs which ERISA en-
tailed.
120. See remarks of Representative Ullman, 120 CONG. Rnc. 29199 (1974), reprinted in
III LEGISLATIV- HIsToRY, supra note 70, at 4674.
121. E.g, ERISA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 1083 (1976) permits the Secretary of the Treasury
under certain circumstances to grant variances from the new funding standards; id § 207, 29
U.S.C. § 1057 (1976), discussed at note 101 supra, permits the Secretary of Labor under
certain circumstances to grant waivers and variances from the new vesting standards; id §
110, 29 U.S.C. § 1030 (1976) permits the Secretary of Labor under certain circumstances to
grant variances from the new disclosure standards.
122. See, e.g., ERISA § 2(b)-(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c) (1976).
123. In the debate on the Conference Report which later became ERISA, Senator Nelson
stated:
In all its deliberations and decisions, Congress was acutely aware that under our volun-
tary pension system the cost of financing pension plans is an important factor in deter-
mining whether a pension plan will be adopted. Unduly large increases in cost canimpede the progress of the private pension system. For this reason, in the case of those
requirements which add to the cost of financing pension plans, Congress tried to adopt
provisions which strike a balance between providing a meaningful protection 
for the
employees and keeping costs within reasonable limits for employers.
120 CON . 29952(1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIV HISTORY, supra note 70, at 4800.
Representative Ullman made the following remarks on the Conference Report:
I want to emphasize that these new requirements have been carefully designed toprovide adequate protection for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable
setting for the growth and development of private pension plans. It is axiomatic to
anyone who has worked for any time in this area that pension plans cannot be expected
to develop if costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for employers who gener-
ally foot most of the bill. This would be self-defeating and would be unfavorable
rather than helpful to the employees for whose benefit this legislation is designed. For
this reason, we have been extremely careful to keep the additional costs very moderate.
The additional costs resulting from the new minimum vesting requirements in the bill,
for example, for the most part is expected to range only from 0 to 1.5 percent of payroll.
d at 29198, reprintedsin g III LEGISLATVE HISTORY, vsupra note 70, at 4673.
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It cannot be doubted that such costs are significant: the most obvious
are those associated with the new vesting, participation and funding
requirements. 24 Additional costs are imposed by compliance with the
new disclosure and filing requirements' 25 and by premiums on
mandatory benefit insurance guaranteeing the employee's receipt of
vested, accrued benefits upon plan termination.126 In addition, an em-
124. The Subcommitteee on SBA and SBIC Legislation and General Small Business
Problems of the House Committee on Small Business recently surveyed all employers which
had notified the PBGC during the period June 1976 through April 1977 that they intended
to terminate pension plans. The questionnaires were designed to obtain information on the
effect of ERISA on the decision to terminate these pension plans. Approximately 79% indi-
cated that ERISA had an effect upon the decision to terminate. Those employers citing
ERISA as a factor affecting their decision to terminate were asked to indicate the extent of
cost increases imposed by ERISA's funding, participation and vesting requirements. Ap-
proximately 48% indicated that the increased "contributions required to provide benefits to
employees entering the plan due to the new eligibility standards" were "very large." Ap-
proximately 30% indicated that the increased "contributions required to meet new minimum
funding standards" were also "very large." Approximately 22% indicated that the cost in-
crease for "providing benefits to terminating employees due to new vesting provisions" was
"very large." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BusINEss, 95TH CONG., lsT Sass., ER-
ISA QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS (Comm. Print 1977), reprintedin [1977] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 25,194 [hereinafter cited as ERISA QUESTIONNAIRE].
125. In a recent survey of employers which were terminating pension plans, those citing
ERISA as a factor affecting their decision to terminate were asked to quantify the cost in-
creases imposed by certain administrative costs associated with ERISA. A large number of
those businesses responding indicated that the cost increases for record keeping (approxi-
mately 27%) and reporting to employees (approximately 26%) were "very large." Over 53%
responded that cost increases related to reporting to government agencies were "also very
large." Id See note 124 supra.
Senators Bentsen and Lugar have sponsored legislation which would reduce the paper-
work required by ERISA. S. 3193, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), discussedin 195 PENs. REp.
(BNA) A-6 (July 3, 1978).
126. The original annual premium rate for single-employer plans was $1.00 per employee
participant. ERISA § 4006(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3) (1976). After studying its potential
liabilities arising from its guarantee of benefits to participants in single-employer plans, the
PBGC found:
As a result of the study, it is clear that the present rate of $1.00 is just not adequate to
finance the claims associated with current and likely future terminations on a sound
basis. By the end of September 1976, the Corporation had about a $41 million deficit.
The deficit has now increased to approximately $60 million.
[1977] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 23,034 (Remarks of Matthew M. Lind, Acting Execu-
tive Director of PBGC). Congress responded by raising the annual premium rate for single-
employer plans to $2.60 per participant. ERISA § 4082(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1381(e) (1976).
ERISA originally provided that the PBGC would guarantee payment of certain benefits
payable under multi-employer plans terminating after January 1, 1978. ERISA § 4082(c),
29 U.S.C. § 1381(c) (1976). The annual premium for multi-employer plans was set at 50
cents per participant. ERISA § 4006(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3) (1976).
A September 29, 1977 PBGC study revealed that,
approximately one-eighth of all multiemployer plans, covering one-fifth of participants
in such plans, are experiencing significant financial hardship which may result in plan
termination.
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ployer is now contingently liable, up to a maximum thirty percent of
net worth, if there are insufficient assets to pay vested pension obliga-
tions upon plan termination.127 Consideration must also be given to
the costs of the relatively new and untested fiduciary duty and civil
liability provisions of ERISA.12 8
The prediction that increased costs would lead to the maintenance
and creation of fewer plans is not contradicted by statistics maintained
by the Internal Revenue Service. These statistics compare the two
years following the adoption of ERISA with previous periods and show
both a significant increase in plan terminations and a decrease in the
number of new plans being written.12 9 Not only are fewer plans being
written, but these new plans are primarily defined contribution plans,
Thus, because of the magnitude of the potential liabilities of terminating multiemployer
plans and its impact on the current insurance program and employers, and because of
the potentially adverse impact of Title IV on the growth and continuance of multiem-
ployer plans, it is essential that a serious and immediate reexamination be undertaken
of the provisions of Title IV applicable to these plans.
H.IR REP. No. 95-706,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1977), reprintedin Pension Benefit Guaran-
tee Corporation, Potential Multiemployer Plan Liabilities Under Title IV of ERSA, [1977] 4
PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CC-) T 23,036.
Congress responded by deferring PBGC's mandatory termination insurance coverage of
multi-employer plans for eighteen months, until July 1, 1979. ERISA § 4082(c), 29 U.S.C. §
1381(c) (1976).
On July 2, 1978 PBGC reported to Congress on multi-employer plan insurance. The
report contains discouraging findings on the financial condition of many multi-employer
plans:
Approximately 160 multiemployer plans covering 1.3 million participants have char-
acteristics indicating a possibility of termination during the next 10 years. If all 160
were to terminate, the total estimated present value of the gross unfunded liability for
the guaranteed benefits would be $8.3 billion. An annual premium of $80 per partici-
pant could be required to finance these liabilities under the current program.
Fact Sheet on Multiemployer Plan Termination Insurance: PBGC Report to Congress, [1977] 4
PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,752. The report contains several proposals designed to
strengthen multi-employer plans and discourage their termination. A modification of the
current guarantee structure and a removal of the current net worth limitation on employer
liability are among the program alternatives suggested. Id
127. ERISA § 4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (1976) (liability of employers under single-
employer plans); ERISA § 4064(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1364(b) (1976) (liability of employer under
multi-employer plans). ERISA § 4023, 29 U.S.C. § 1363 (1976) directs the PBGC to insure
or arrange for others to insure employers against contingent liabilities arising from plan
termination. The PBGC has recently reported to Congress that the contingent employer
liability insurance program is not feasible and has recommended further study of several
alternative approaches which would restructure employer liability. Fact Sheet on Contingent
Employer Liability Insurance: Status Report to the Congress, [1977] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) $ 22,752.
128. For a discussion of these new fiduciary standards and the liabilities of fiduciaries, see
Little & ThralkiM Fiduciaries Under ERISA:A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1
(1977).
129. The following table sets forth annual totals of new plans and terminated plans from
1965 to 1976 and the ratio of new plans to terminated plans:
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which are exempt from ERISA's costly funding and insurance require-
ments and often provide smaller benefits than defined benefit plans.130
However, it is not altogether clear that the contraction of the pension
plan population is attributable entirely to ERISA. Although the new
legislation is highly suspect as a principal cause of that decline, 131 sev-
eral preliminary surveys of terminated plans have been made with va-
rying results.'13 2  Without data on the lost pension benefits associated
Tax-Qualified Corporate Plans
Ratio of
Terminated New Plans to
New Plans Plans Terminated
1965 13,532 1,036 13.1
1966 18,183 1,210 15.0
1967 20,521 1,307 15.7
1968 23,782 1,443 16.5
1969 28,075 1,729 16.2
1970 32,574 2,306 14.1
1971 40,664 3,335 12.2
1972 49,335 3,520 14.0
1973 59,605 4,130 14.4
1974 59,385 4,604 12.9
1975 30,039 8,108 3.7
1976 25,820 15,859 1.6
Library of Congress, Jan. 27, 1978, reprinted in Scheibla, Revamping ERJ'SA, Barron's, May
1, 1978, at 4, 5, cols. 2 and 3.
These statistics suggest a substantial reduction in the growth of the plan population. It
must be noted, however, that these statistics reflect only the number of pension plans, and it
is unknown how many employees are covered under such plans.
In addition, PBGC has stated that a large number of existing multi-employer plans are in
poor financial condition and may be terminated. See note 126 supra.
130. Congressional Research Service Report on Pension Plan Terminations, reprinted i
129 PENS. REP. (BNA) R-23 (March 21, 1977).
131. In an attempt to estimate how many pension plan terminations would have occurred
in the absence of ERISA, regression analysis was applied to control for the effects of infla-
tion and historical and seasonal trends. It was then estimated that, absent ERISA, there
would have been 9,132 plan terminations in the 24 month period following ERISA's enact-
ment; instead 21,123 occurred. Id
In a recent survey of employers which were terminating pension plans, approximately
79% of those responding indicated that ERISA affected their decision to terminate. Sub-
stantialy all (93%) of those citing ERISA as a cause of termination indicated that its in-
creased costs had some effect on the termination decision. ERISA QUESTIoNNAIRE, supra
note 124.
A survey by Senator Lugar of small Indiana businesses indicated that ERISA is the prin-
cipal reason for the high rate of plan terminations and the reduced number of new plans
being written by that survey's sample group. 195 PENS. RPP. (BNA) A-6 (July 3, 1978).
132. A PBGC analysis of single-employer defined benefit plan terminations in 1975 re-
vealed that in those terminations involving an ongoing employer, 35% indicated a new pen-
sion plan as the reason for termination; 12% indicated ERISA as the only reason for
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with terminated and unwritten plans and any lowering of pension ben-
efits under present and future plans, it cannot be determined if ERISA
has resulted in net losses or gains to society. The benefits lost as a result
of ERISA must be compared to the increased security and benefit
levels of persons receiving or expecting benefit payments under ER-
ISA.133 Many other costs must be identified, including those imposed
by ERISA's many requirements. Several cost-benefit studies of post-
ERISA plan experiences are being considered by various groups, in-
cluding Congress and several government agencies.
134
It is here that we find the first cost of Daniel: its effects may well be
intermingled with those of ERISA, making it difficult to evaluate the
latter. Many plan terminations and failures to raise benefit levels or to
termination and an additional 11% cited ERISA and other reasons for termination. Al-
though 77% did not cite ERISA as a reason for termination, some pension experts have
questioned the validity of these responses. Under preexisting IRS rules, the discontinuance
of a pension plan within a few years of adoption for other than valid business reasons could
result in adverse tax consequences. Congressional Research Service Report on Pension
Plan Terminations, reprinted in 129 PENS. REP. (BNA) R-23-24 (March 21, 1977).
133. The amount of social loss does not equal the reduction in pension benefits produced
by ERISA-related cancellations or failures to write new pension plans. Presumably employ-
ers will pay alternative compensation approximately equal to that which would have been
contributed to the pension fund. Perhaps longevity bonuses or other fringe benefits will be
substituted for pension plans. This will produce a social loss, however, because employers
and employees will be forced to a less preferred position by the regulation. The fact that
before the regulation they chose pensions over other forms of compensation suggests that
they valued pensions more than they valued the other forms of compensation. The social
loss will equal this difference in valuation.
Since the alternative compensation may not qualify for the preferential tax treatment af-
forded pension plans, employees may ultimately receive less than they would have received
under a pension plan and the government may receive more. There will be an additional
social loss measured by the difference in consumer satisfaction created when the government
spends the money as compared to that created if the pensioners could have spent it them-
selves. Additional losses may be generated by the transaction costs of devising and imple-
menting the substitute forms of compensation.
134. ERISA § 512, 29 U.S.C. § 1142 (1976), establishes the Advisory Council on Em-
ployee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans which is to advise the Secretary of Labor. Id §
513(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1143(a) (1976) directs the Secretary of Labor to undertake specified
research studies on pension plans. Id §§ 3021-3022, 29 U.S.C. 1221-1222 (1976) create the
Joint Pension, Profit Sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plan Task Force and direct it
to make a study of certain aspects of pension plans. Id § 303 1(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (1976)
directs certain Congressional committees to undertake specified studies of retirement plans.
Id § 3032, 29 U.S.C. 1232 (1976), directs the Secretary of Labor to study the pension rights
of personnel employed under federal procurement, construction or research contracts and
grants. President Carter has appointed a Presidential Retirement Policy Commission to
study the implications of the growth of private and public pension systems. As part of its
work it will analyze the impact of ERISA. Study on the Growth of Pension Systems is Urged
by Carter, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1978, at 5, col. 2.
The House Small Business Committee is studying the impact of ERISA on Small Business
and has held hearings in this regard. 160 PENS. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 24, 1977).
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write new plans may have been prompted by DanieN application of
the antifraud provisions of the securities acts to expectancy interests in
mandatory, non-contributory pension plans. However, it would be all
but impossible to separate Daniels effects from those of ERISA. ER-
ISA was enacted in September 1974. Its various requirements have
different effective dates, commencing in January 1975 and continuing
thereafter. Some provisions are not yet in effect. At a time when
many are studying ERISA and attempting to identify and evaluate its
costs and benefits, it seems ill-advised to superimpose the amorphous
liabilities associated with the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
One good argument for reversing Daniel is that doing so will permit
ERISA alone to regulate plans. At least the possibility would then
exist that tolerably accurate data could be collected and informed
choices could be made as to whether ERISA alone or in combination
with additional regulation is, or would be, beneficial.
The difficulty that applying the federal securities laws to pension
funds has created in terms of assessing the effects of ERISA, however,
may be among the lesser costs of the Daniel decision. The likely im-
pact of that case in terms of the vesting and break in service provisions
of existing plans will be much greater. Mr. Daniel, for example, failed
to satisfy the stringent vesting and break in service rules of the Local
705 Plan. Congress was aware of the plight of Mr. Daniel and others
like him when it debated pension reform.135 It decided to remedy this
perceived inequity not merely by requiring adequate disclosure of plan
rules to employees but also by adopting a pervasive scheme of substan-
tive rules relating to the vesting and break in service features of pension
plans.1 36 It considered a great deal of data on the costs and benefits
produced by these new requirements and declined to apply them retro-
actively.1 37 Congress undoubtedly realized that the increased costs im-
posed by retroactive application of the vesting and break in service
standards would most likely result in the wholesale dismemberment of
existing pension plans.1 38 Instead it opted for gradual and prospective
135. See note 75 supra.
136. For a discussion of the new vesting and break in service requirements, see notes 97-
102 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 102 and 119 supra.
138. The Supreme Court has recently indicated its reluctance to impose large, unexpected
retroactive liabilities on pension funds. In Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978), the Court held that a pension plan violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The Court did not require refund of excess contributions by female employees.
It stated:
The assets held in trust for these employees are vast and growing-more than $400
billion were reserved for retirement benefits at the end of 1977 and reserves are increas-
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changes in the rules governing pension plans.1
39
In spite of the explicit Congressional decision to avoid the high costs
of retroactive application of ERISA's vesting and break in service rules,
the Daniel court, using the antifraud provisions of the securities laws,
has provided a means for the imposition of precisely those costs; 140 dis-
satisfied employees may now try to obtain increased benefits under the
auspices of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts. While there
are various estimates of the number of employees who, prior to ERISA,
would never have received any benefits under their pension plans,
14 1
the district court and the court of appeals in Daniel both cited a Senate
study indicating that only eight percent of the participants in pension
plans with eleven-year or longer vesting requirements would ever re-
ceive any benefits under such plans.142  Daniel will enfranchise the re-
ing by almost $50 billion a year. These plans, like other forms of insurance depend on
the accumulation of large sums to cover contingencies. The amounts set aside are de-
termined by a painstaking assessment of the insurer's likely liability. Risks that the
insurer foresees will be included in the calculation of liability, and the rates or contribu-
tions charged will reflect that calculation. The occurrence of major unforeseen contin-
gencies, however, jeopardizes the insurer's solvency and, ultimately, the insureds'
benefits. Drastic changes in the legal rules governing pension and insurance funds, like
other unforeseen events, can have this effect. Consequently, the rules that apply to these
fund should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded
that result.
* * * Retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund. The harm
would fall in large part on innocent third parties. If, as the courts below apparently
contemplated, the plaintiffs' contributions are recovered from the pension fund, the
administrators of the fund will be forced to meet unchanged obligations with dimin-
ished assets. If the reserve proves inadequate, either the expectations of all retired
employees will be disappointed or current employees will be forced to pay not only for
their own future security but also for the unanticipated reduction in the contributions of
past employees.
Id at 1382-83 (footnotes omitted). The Court noted that Congress had been careful to
provide gradual and prospective changes in the rules governing pension plans in ERISA,
and declined to impose immediate and huge plan costs through the judiciary. Id at 1382
n.40.
139. Id
140. Moreover, Congress specifically delayed application of portions of ERISA to certain
existing pension plans made pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. ERISA §
211(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1061(c)(2) (1976). Application of the antifraud provisions of the se-
curities law may nullify this delayed application.
141. These estimates ranged from 10% to 331A%. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 30003 (1973)
(remarks of Sen. Williams) (33%), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at
1599; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP.
No. 93-383, 93d CONG., 1st SEss. (28%), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70,
at 1089; 119 CONG. REc. 29839 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Jackson) (22%), reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 1267; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN REsoRM, S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d CONG., Ist SEss. 151 (1973) (additional
views of Sen. Hartke) (10%), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 70, at 1218.
142. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. at 551, affd, 561 F.2d at
1229, cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
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maining ninety two percent who will seek their benefits under the
securities laws.
Some attempts have been made to estimate the potential liabilities
imposed upon pension funds as a result of the Daniel holding. The
Department of Labor recently released an actuarial study on the esti-
mated potential liabilities of private pension and profit sharing plans as
a result of Daniel. The study estimated that potential liabilities could
be as high as 39.6 billion dollars, depending upon the applicable statute
of limitations. The study projected that the greater costs imposed by
Daniel will inevitably lead to more plan terminations, reduced benefits
under existing plans, larger expenditures by the PBGC, and the writing
of fewer new plans.1
43
In its amicus curiae brief before the court of appeals, the ERISA
Regulations Industry Committee'" urged reversal of the district court
order. The Committee conservatively assumed that only one third of
143. The study assumes that the applicable measure of damages is the value of accrued
benefits and that all plaintiffs are successful in their suits. The study estimates the following
potential liabilities:
ESTIMATED RANGE OF POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR ACCRUED BENEFITS
(All figures in $ billions)
Estimated Range of Potential Liability by Class of Plan
Terminated Non- Collectively All Private Pension Plans
Statute Vested Employees Bargained
Limitations Entitled to Dam- Multiemployer All Collectively Contributory Non-Contributory
Starts to Run ages Plans Bargained Plans Plans Plans All Plans
From date of
terminations All S 1.7-2.8 S 3.5--5.8 s 1.1-1.9 $ 7.0-11.6 $ 8.1-13.5
5 or more
years service 1.4-2.3 2.9-4.8 0.9-1.5 5.7-9.5 6.6-11.0
10 or more
years service 0.8-1.3 1.6-2.6 0.5--0.8 3.0-5.0 3.5--5.8
From age 65 All 4.9-8.1 10.1-16.9 3.3-5.5 20.5-34.1 23.8-39.6
5 or more
years service 4.0-6.6 8.3-13.9 2.7-4.5 16.7-27.8 19.4-32.3
10 or more
years service 2.2-3.6 4.7-7.8 1.4-2.4 8.7-14.5 10.1-16.9
[1978] 4 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,228.
144. This committeee is an ad hoc group of representatives of 80 major United States
corporations engaged in a wide cross-section of American business. These corporations
maintain a total of over 900 separate employee retirement plans covering nearly 7 million
employees. See Motion for Leave to Submit Brief as Amicus Curiae of the ERISA Regula-
tions Industry Committee (ERIC) at 2-3, Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) (cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA
Regulations Industry Committee Brief].
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the participants in existing plans would receive any retirement bene-
fits.1 45 The Committee then calculated that ten million participants in
union-negotiated plans would not receive any benefits. If those par-
ticipants sued and prevailed in Daniel causes of action, the Committee
calculated that employers would be exposed to a potential contingent
liability for collectively bargained plans alone of 300 billion dollars.'
46
The court of appeals made no serious attempt to deal with this calcu-
lation or with its potential effect on the termination and creation of
pension plans in the future. Nor did the court appear to consider ef-
fects upon the distribution of income between shareholders and em-
ployee interests if multiple antifraud actions are brought by employees.
Instead it characterized the ERISA Committee calculations as a
"parade of horribles" and attributed the large numbers to the zeal of
advocacy.147
While the ERISA Regulations Committee figures may be high,
148
the march of disappointed employees to the federal court house has
already begun. Prior to the filing of the Daniel complaint on Novem-
ber 3, 1974, and even prior to Judge Kirkland's March 1, 1976 opinion
and order denying dismissal of the securities law counts of the Daniel
complaint, pension benefit cases traditionally did not include claims for
relief under federal securities law.149 Not surprisingly, the Daniel case
145. There are varying estimates as to the number of persons who will never receive any
benefits under their pension plans. The court of appeals in Daniel referred to an actuarial
probability as low as 8% that an employee would receive any benefits under his pension
plan. 561 F.2d at 1227, cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). Other estimates range from
10% to 3373%. See note 141 supra. The ERISA Committee's use of the figure of 33V% was
thus conservative.
146. The average annual retirement benefit paid in 1973, when Mr. Daniel retired was
$2,000. The Committeee thus assumed for purposes of its calculations a $2,000 annual re-
tirement benefit and an average retirement life of 10 years. The Committee, however, did
not concede that the appropriate measure of damages would be the promised pension bene-
fits. ERISA Regulations Industry Committee Brief, supra note 144, at 2-3.
147. 561 F.2d at 1250, cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978). The court of appeals further
noted that plan liability would be limited by a number of factors such as the statute of
limitations and the need for plaintiffs to prove justifiable reliance. Id
Since the conduct proscribed by the court in Daniel appears to have been the omission of
material facts (the statistically determinable risk that an employee would never receive any
benefits), it is logical that courts following Daniel will adhere to the traditional securities law
approach of presuming reliance. For the enunciation of the rule that reliance may be pre-
sumed in cases of material omission, see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972).
148. These calculations erroneously assume that the appropriate measure of damages is
"lost profits." This is not the case; the damages should be limited to out-of-pocket costs.
For a discussion of the appropriate measure of damages, see note 44 supra. For information
on the ERISA Regulations Industry Committee, see note 144 supra.
149. This has caused one federal judge to comment that although the securities acts have
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has received much attention. The availability of a securities cause of
action has apparently captured the eye and pen of many small practi-
tioners representing employees, or former employees, whose pension or
employee benefit plan expectations have never materialized. In the
district courts, at least twenty such cases have been filed.15 Almost all
the cases involve benefits under mandatory, non-contributory, multi-
employer pension plans. Five of the cases were plead as class actions.
A majority of the cases include the pension trusts as a defendant. While
the claims for relief are often plead in the alternative and framed in
generalities, most seek judgment in an amount equal to the benefits
allegedly wrongfully denied.'51
The costs of these actions will be increased because of several
problems associated with implied private damage actions under the an-
tifraud sections. First, the cause of action is an implied one and there-
fore lacks many of the restrictions contained in express rights of
action. 52 Second, the modem commercial activities to which the anti-
fraud sections apply are vastly different from the typical transaction
covered by the common law tort of fraud and deceit in which privity
requirements, forseeability and face-to-face dealing placed practical
limits on recovery.153 The development of modem telecommunication
technology has created a large and impersonal commercial environ-
ment where the lack of face-to-face dealing, coupled with the lack of a
privity requirement,'54 make possible "Draconian" damages and dam-
age recovery. 55 This concern is particularly applicable to large pen-
sion plans, where there may be no direct dealings between the
employee and the plan trustees, the union or the employer. Third, se-
curities antifraud litigation is often particularly difficult to dispose of
prior to trial.156 All of these problems give an antifraud, suit addi-
tional settlement value, unrelated to its merits. The threat of extensive
been around since 1933, "nobody has had the temerity to argue that this was a security until
Daniel was decided." Weins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,005 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
150. See Appendix A.
151. For a discussion of the appropriate measure of damages, see note 44 supra.
152. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
153. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975).
154. Id at 744-47.
155. The potential for large damage judgments in private damage actions under the
antifraud provisions has concerned several courts. See, eg., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J. concurring). See
also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
156. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-42 (1975).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
discovery of business records and unwarranted disruption of business
activities contribute to its settlement potential.157
These very concerns caused the Supreme Court to check the growth
of implied private damage actions under section 10(b) and rule l0b-5.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores," 8 the Court commented
extensively on the potential abuses associated with such litigation and
affirmed the twenty-year-old "Birnbaum rule"159 limiting standing in
implied private damage actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to
actual purchasers and sellers of securities. In so doing, the Court articu-
lated its unwillingness to risk substantial damage recovery by persons
lacking objective evidence of their reliance upon the defendant's deceit.
If non-purchasers and non-sellers were permitted to recover damages
under the antifraud provision of the 1934 Exchange Act, the elements
of their causes of action would be totally within their own subjective
states of mind, unknown and unknowable by the defendant.
16 0
An examination of the Daniel record reveals many of the characteris-
tics of the litigation which so concerned the Supreme Court in Blue
Chip. Subsequent to the filing of his complaint, Mr. Daniel filed an
affidavit which the court of appeals treated as part of the pleadings for
purposes of review. Plaintiff swore that he believed that he would re-
ceive a pension after twenty years of employment with Local 705-cov-
ered employers and that in no event would employer contributions be
forfeited. Mr. Daniel further stated in his affidavit that his belief con-
157. Id at 739-41.
158. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
159. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
160. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 746 (1975) the Court carefully
analyzed this problem:
But in the absence of the Birnbaum rule, it would be sufficient for a plaintiff toprove
that he had failed to purchase or sell stock by reason of a defendant's violation of Rule
lOb-5. The manner in which the defendant's violation caused the plaintiff to fail to act
could be as a result of the reading of a prospectus, as respondent claims here, but it
could just as easily come as a result of a claimed reading of information contained in
the financial pages of a local newspaper. Plaintiffs proof would not be that he
purchased or sold stock, a fact which would be capable of documentary verification in
most situations, but instead that he decided not to purchase or sell stock. Plaintiffs
entire testimony could be dependent upon uncorroborated oral evidence of many of the
crucial elements of his claim, and still be sufficient to go to the jury. The jury would
not even have the benefit of weighing the plaintiffs version against the defendant's
version, since the elements to which the plaintiff would testify would be in many cases
totally unknown and unknowable to the defendant. The very real risk in permitting
those in respondent's position to sue under Rule lob-5 is that the door will be open to
recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who offers only his own testimony to
prove that he ever consulted aprospectus of the issuer, that he paid any attention to it,
or that the representations contained in it damaged him.
Id at 745-46 (footnotes omitted).
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tinued after receipt of many communications about the plan from his
union and the plan trustees. Finally, Mr. Daniel claimed that he
would have changed jobs had he known how the vesting requirements
would be applied.161
The Daniel case presents examples of the very type of subjective alle-
gations which prevent settlement before trial. This would be so even if
the plan brochures and communications had clearly stated that twenty
years of uninterrupted, continuous employment was required for bene-
fit eligibility.
162
Application of the antifraud provisions to employee expectancy in-
terests in mandatory, non-contributory pension plans is a branch of the
General Sherman Tree which the Court sought to prune in Blue
Cho.163 Based upon the holding in Daniel, any employee whose pen-
sion benefits did not vest or whose benefits were less than expected,
and perhaps even those employees who were not eligible for participa-
tion at all, can, on the basis of oral testimony and affidavits, plead a
cause of action under the antifraud sections. Since the pension plan is
mandatory and non-contributory, there will be no objective evidence of
161. The Affidavit stated:
6. In 1955, I was notified by a letter... that Local 705 had established a pension
fund for its members who worked for employers who had entered into labor contracts
with Local 705. At that time, and at all times thereafter, I understood and believed that
a Local 705 member would be eligible to receive a retirement benefit upon completing
20 years of employnient with Local 705 covered employers....
7. Because of my limited educational background and my concern for financial se-
curity in my old age, the pension plan... was a material factor in my continuing in
employment with Local 705 covered employers. Had I known of the way in which...
[the] trustees would interpret the eligibility requirements for a retirement benefit, I
would have sought employment ... elsewhere--with retirement benefits of the type I
understood Local 705 to be offering.
8. . . . I received various communications, both through the mails and otherwise,
... pertaining to and describing the Local 705 pension plan .... After receiving all
such communications it remained my understanding and belief that I would receive a
pension were I to complete 20 years of employment with Local 705 covered employers.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, Appendix at 2.4,
Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.
Ct. 1232 (1978).
162. This was precisely the situation presented in Schlansky v. United Merchants &
Mfrs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In that case an employee received no credit
for his prior employment with the defendant employer's predecessor in interest and thus
failed to qualify for pension benefits. The court, in dismissing the plaintiffs contract cause
of action without leave to amend, found that the expressed terms of the written contract (the
pension plan) precluded crediting of the former employment. However, the court, follow-
ing Daniel stated that relief could be afforded through an implied cause of action under the
1934 Exchange Act.
163. "When we deal with private actions under Rule lob-5, we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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any employee's understanding. Compared to the costs involved in this
situation, the costs of ERISA seem small indeed.
B. The Benefits of Daniel
In order to produce any economic benefit 1" to society at all in the
context of ERISA regulation, the securities laws must reduce the cost of
producing information, produce better information at comparable cost,
or beneficially alter the timing and delivery of that information.
First, consider the possibility that the securities laws may reduce the
cost of providing information. Absent ERISA, a powerful argument
could be made that the most efficient way to preserve the private pen-
sion system and at the same time promote employee retirement income
security would be to subject employee interests in pension plans to the
federal securities laws. After existing pension plan exemptions from
securities law registration and reporting provisions were removed,
165
adequate disclosures of plan provisions to employees would presuma-
bly be "insured" by the securities laws, and market forces would deter-
mine the appropriate vesting, funding and break in service plan
provisions. Society might have been better off if it had used the securi-
ties laws to regulate pension plans, rather than expending resources on
lengthy pension reform studies and deliberations and on the adminis-
tration of and compliance with ERISA's many requirements.
But Congress did not choose to regulate the pension system through
the securities acts. Instead it opted for the pervasive regulatory scheme
of ERISA, under which the Internal Revenue Service, the Secretary of
Labor and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation share adminis-
trative responsibility. 6 The problems of coordination and conflict in-
herent in such an arrangement have already caused several legislators
164. An "economic benefit" is only produced when the aggregate wealth of society is
increased. The fact that Mr. Daniel and others may receive judgments in lieu of unmet
pension expectations does not produce any economic benefit. Since the costs of these judg-
ments will be paid by employers, other employees, or shareholders, a mere redistribution of
wealth will occur.
165. The position of the SEC that interests in pension plans are thus exempted is dis-
cussed in note 35 supra.
166. Apparently the shared jurisdiction came about because the two Senate committees
with jurisdiction over ERISA wanted to entrust its administration to different agencies.
The Senate Finance Committee wanted to give jurisdiction to the IRS and the Senate Labor
Committee (now the Senate Human Resources Committee) wanted the Department of La-
bor to administer ERISA. The dual jurisdiction is a result of a compromise between the
two views. Scheibla, Revamping ERISA, Barron's, May 1, 1978, at 4, 5, col. 2.
For a discussion of these complex jurisdictional relationships, see Lee, The "Elaborate
Interweaving of Jurisdiction" Labor and Administration and Enforcement of ERISA and
Beyond, 10 U. RICH. L Rv. 463 (1976).
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to propose the formation of a new federal agency with exclusive juris-
diction over pension plans. 67 Existing difficulties will be further com-
pounded by SEC involvement which will, almost certainly, increase the
already high administrative costs of ERISA. In the context of ERISA,
and the existing exemption of pension plans from the reporting and
registration provisions of the securities acts, it does not appear to be
efficient to classify employee expectancy interests in pension plans as
securities and thereby to add the SEC and the federal securities laws to
the already long list of federal agencies and laws which govern private
pension plans.
Consider next the possibilities that application of the securities laws
under Daniel will produce better information at comparable cost or
will beneficially alter the timing and delivery of that information.
Some have heralded the application of the securities laws because their
application has been thought to increase the protection of employees
and their pension expectations by requiring disclosure of information
earlier than does ERISA.'68 It appears, however, that the court of ap-
peals in Daniel was incorrect in its assumption that application of the
antifraud provisions would produce that result, since, according to the
SEC, substantially all pension plans are exempted from the registration
and reporting provisions of the securities acts.169 The antifraud sec-
tions merely prohibit misleading or deceptive statements; they do not
require detailed affirmative disclosure of any specific information. 
170
167. According to a recent feature article in Barron's, the Department of Labor and the
IRS cannot agree on how to proceed under ERISA and employers often receive conflicting
answers from the two agencies. Scheibla, RevampingERISA, Barron's, May 1, 1978, at 4,5,
col. 3. According to the same article, a bill has recently been approved by the Senate Fi-
nance Committee which attempts to define and separate the jurisdiction of the two agencies,
thereby minimizing overlap. Some legislators oppose this approach and favor the creation
of a new agency with exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA. Id
Senators Williams and Javits have introduced a bill in the Senate which would overhaul
many portions of ERISA. S. 3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. Rnc. 6581 (1978). This
bill calls for the creation of a new federal agency, the Employee Benefits Commission, which
would have exclusive responsibility for enforcing ERISA. Authors of Private Pension Fund
Law Seek Rules To Solve Problems It Created, Wall St. J., May 2, 1978, at 5, col. 1. For
further discussion of this proposed legislation, see note 183 infra.
168. Defendants have not shown that ERISA would provide relief to persons who have
acquired an interest in a pension fund where false or misleading representations have been
made at inception or during subsequent ratifications, or upon ajob offer. Aflirmance of the
judgment below will supplement ERISA by providing a self-executing compulsion to dis-
close adequate information at such times, including a statistically determinable risk that
many employees covered by a plan will never receive their pension benefits.
Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1977) (footnotes
omitted), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
169. See note 35 supra.
170. The SEC agrees with this position. See note 174 bfra.
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Moreover, it is not likely that any information produced as a result of
Daniel will be "better" information.171 This seems so because the prin-
cipal way of determining what facts are material, and must thus be
disclosed to preclude securities antifraud liability is through judicial or
administrative hindsight. The application of such hindsight is demon-
strated by the court of appeals' statement the antifraud provisions re-
quire disclosure of a "statistically determinable risk that many
employees covered by a plan will never receive their pension bene-
fits." '172 This problem prompted Senators Williams and Javits to ask
the chairman of the Commission for written guidelines detailing the
categories of pension plan information required to be disclosed under
the anti fraud sections.173 The Commission did not provide the re-
quested guidelines on the grounds that the antifraud provisions do not
contain any requirement of detailed affirmative disclosure. 174
Since there are not, and apparently cannot be, any guidelines indi-
cating in advance what type of information must be furnished to em-
ployees or when it must be furnished, it is virtually certain that the
antifraud provisions will not produce "better" information at compa-
rable costs. Nor can the antifraud sections beneficially alter the tim-
ing and delivery of information. The uncertainty over what type of
information must be disclosed and when it must be disclosed will most
probably increase the already significant costs imposed by the Daniel
decision.
171. It is doubtful that application of the antifraud provisions win result in increased
pension plan disclosures. It is more likely that the Daniel holding will result in less, rather
than more, disclosure since wary and well-advised employers, unions, and plan trustees may
make no statements or representations whatsoever about the pension plan prior to the time
that written disclosures are mandated by ERISA. For a discussion of these written disclo-
sures, see notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text.
172. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1249 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 1232 (1978).
173. Letter from Senators Williams and Javits to SEC Chairman Williams (Nov. 21,
1977), reprinted in 4 J. PENs. PLAN & COMPLIANCE 8 (1978).
174. JT]he antifraud provisions do not constitute a general requirement of detailed af-
firmative disclosure, either oral or written. Nor do they require that documents be filed
with and processed by the Commission.
. .. [T]here is, and can be, no definite list of items which must be disclosed under the
antifraud provisions.
... The antifraud provisions rely on the concept of materiality, and the courts have
consistently stressed that materiality must be judged on a case-by-case basis. ... There is
no "specific rule" as to what facts are material: that determination must be made "on a case-
by-case basis according to the fact pattern of each transaction."
Memorandum from the SEC Office of General Counsel to SEC Chairman Williams (Dec. 7,
1977), reprinted in 4 J. PENS. PLAN & COMPLIANCE 11, 14 (1978) (sent to Senators Williams
and Javits by SEC Chairman Williams in response to their November 21, 1977 letter).
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Even if the existing exemption of pension plans from the registration
and reporting requirements were removed, it is doubtful that the de-
tailed information on plan assets and investments thereby produced
would be of significant value to employees. Given ERISA's early vest-
ing requirements and the fact that receipt of vested pension benefits is
now, or shortly will be, insured by the federal government through the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 75 the risk traditionally associ-
ated with an investment in a security has largely been removed.
176
Information concerning the participation, vesting and break in serv-
ice provisions of the pension plan is now provided under ERISA. 177 It
is highly questionable whether the earlier delivery of this information is
important. Any false information disseminated to employees at job of-
fer, plan inception or at ratification of a collective bargaining agree-
ment covering a pension plan1 78 will be corrected in a relatively short
time by the easily understood and accurate plan description furnished
to employees under ERISA shortly after they become plan partici-
pants. 79  Thus, the value of having accurate information somewhat
earlier may be comparatively inconsequential in view of the high costs
associated with application of the securities laws.
Application of the securities laws to pension plans will not reduce the
cost of producing information. Instead, it will probably increase the
cost. It will not produce better information at comparable cost. Nor
will it beneficially alter the timing or delivery of information. In light
of these realities, it is extremely unlikely that Daniel will produce any
economic benefit to society.
175. For a discussion of plan termination insurance, see notes 94-96 supra and accompa-
nying text.
176. Employees whose benefits have not fully vested are at risk but their risk has little to
do with plan assets and investments. Information on plan assets and investments which
would be produced under the registration and reporting provisions would be of little value
to those employees. Their real risk is that the pension plan or their employer's operations
will be discontinued. Thus, the information truly relevant to them concerns participating
employers' operations and not plan assets and investments.
Furthermore some employers may already be furnishing this information in another con-
text. Those employers who have chosen to enter the nation's capital market, the real focus
of the federal securities law, are already producing and publicizing this type of information
under the securities law. Other employers who have not entered the public capital market
are not publicizing this information. Compulsory public disclosure of this type of financial
information merely because an employer maintains a pension plan is unwarranted. There
are obvious political and financial ramifications involved in such a decision and the judici-
ary is ill-equipped to assess them.
177. For a discussion of the new disclosure requirements, see notes 110-17 supra and
accompanying text.
178. See note 168 supra.
179. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
This author cannot understand why additional regulation of pension
plans through the securities law is necessary or appropriate. There is
no need to contort the definition of an investment contract to gerry-
mander expectancy interests in mandatory, non-contributory defined
benefit plans into the securities acts. There is no evidence that to do so
would encourage informed investor decision making, one of the pri-
mary purposes behind the securities acts. The traditional benefit asso-
ciated with labeling something as a security is the increased affirmative
disclosure of detailed information required by the registration and re-
porting provisions of the securities acts. This will not occur here be-
cause substantially all pension plans are exempted from these
requirements.
Moreover, the detailed information generated by the registration and
reporting requirements would be costly to produce and would be of
little interest to employees. Their primary concern is with the vesting
and eligibility provisions of their pension plans. Information of this
type is already provided to them under ERISA. It is not cost-effective
to use the securities law to provide it at a somewhat earlier time. Any
additional information concerning the investment policies of the pen-
sion trust or the value of its assets is of no value to employees. The
early vesting and ultimate receipt of vested benefits is guaranteed by
ERISA.
Some persons would justify application of the securities laws to pen-
sion plans by arguing that the antifraud provisions of those laws oper-
ate as a federal fraud statute which would rectify and deter fraud.
180
P.T. Barnum and many before and after him have used a variety of
selling techniques to part buyers from their money. Fraud existed long
before Congress, the federal securities laws or even the SEC, and there
is considerable evidence to suggest its continuing existence despite their
exemplary efforts to bring it to an end. Absent evidence that the secur-
ities law or the SEC is more efficient at preventing pension fraud than
are the available alternatives-which include ERISA, the Internal Rev-
enue Service, the Department of Labor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
180. SEC Chairman Williams recently appeared before the Senate Human Resources
Committee in connection with S. 3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REc. 6581 (1978)
which, among other things, would preclude application of the antifraud provisions of the
securities acts to employee interests in pension plans. Chairman Williams argued that the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts should apply to pension plans since they
would prevent and rectify fraud. SEC Chief is Wary of Proposal to Exempt Pension Funds
from Antfraud Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1978, at 6, col. 2.
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Corporation, and state law remedies-there is no reason not to leave
the matter in those already numerous hands. The availability of some
of these remedies is demonstrated by the fact that Mr. Daniel and those
emulating him have plead several other legal theories in their com-
plaints.
181
The federal courts have had great difficulty in resisting repeated en-
treaties to expand the scope of the federal securities laws. This is prob-
ably due in part to the attractiveness and apparent reasonableness of
requests for more information about whatever may be involved, and
the usually unarticulated assumption that such information is essen-
tially costless to produce. It is generally assumed by courts that the
social benefits of extending the federal securities laws will exceed the
social costs.
It has been argued that this is a dubious proposition even as to the
registration provisions of the 1933 Securities Act. 8 2 Regardless of the
validity of that argument, it seems clear that application of the anti-
fraud provisions to pension plans is not an efficient way to increase the
future flow of relevant information, even assuming that such an in-
crease is desirable. It would be far better for Congress simply to spec-
ify what disclosures are required,18 3 thereby preventing the court
181. Since the time of the district court's decision in Daniel, at least 20 pension cases have
been filed in the district courts seeking relief under the federal securities law in addition to
other relief requested. Ten include claims for relief under ERISA and 20 include claims for
relief based on other laws such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.
For more information on these cases, see Appendix A.
182. See, e.g., Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 Bus. LAW. 721
(1964).
183. The question is now before the Supreme Court and Congress. On May 1, 1978,
Senators Williams and Javits introduced the proposed ERISA Improvements Act of 1978, S.
3017, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 6851 (1978). In its present form, the bill will
preclude application of the securities laws to interests in private employee benefit plans such
as mandatory, non-contributory defined benefit plans. Section 274(2) of S. 3017 states that
interests in such plans "shall not be characterized as or deemed to be, a security within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or any law of
any State which regulates securities ... ." Section 274 exempts from the securities laws all
plans covered by ERISA except individual account plans in which participation is volun-
tary.
The issue has also recently been considered by the Federal Securities Code Project of the
American Law Institute. This project is an attempt to integrate into one statute the various
laws under which the SEC currently has administrative responsibility. It is hoped that the
new code will eliminate the duplications and complexities which have arisen under the 7
statutes over which the SEC now has jurisdiction. Cheek, Exemptions Under the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REv. 355, 355 (1977).
A consensus of the advisory group which assisted the Reporter, Professor Louis Loss, in
drafting the Code, and a substantial majority at the October 1977 meeting of an American
Bar Association committee felt that it was not efficient to have the SEC as well as the IRS
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congestion which will be a natural result of the subjective standards of
proof permitted by the Daniel court. When such congressional action
is possible, it seems inappropriate to burden the judicial branch with
the task of resolving the issue of who said what to whom about a pen-
sion plan, most likely at least a decade ago. A poorer use of resources,
even in a society that has a wholesome regard for litigation, can hardly
be imagined.
It is difficult to believe that a court would have reached the result
reached in Daniel if it had reflected upon the implications of its deci-
sion in the context of some clearly-stated desirable and achievable so-
cial ends, and had it then considered the most cost-effective means of
achieving those ends. If the end was to increase the future flow of
information, the means chosen were not cost-effective. Furthermore,
the end of giving Mr. Daniel and others like him the pension that they
want is simply not achievable.
The Daniel court's expansion of the securities law to regulate em-
ployee interests in pension plans appears to be counterproductive.
While this does not necessarily imply that judicial expansion in other
contexts will not be cost-efficient, it does raise the question of whether
courts are equipped to perform what many would describe as legisla-
tive functions. It may be observed, for example, that courts are often
inclined to respond to a litigant's superficially sympathetic entreaties
by expanding the laws without regard to the costs or benefits produced
and Department of Labor in the business of protecting employees. It was felt that if ERISA
did not adequately cover a particular type of pension plan, Congress should be urged to
amend ERISA. The advisory group concluded that the SEC should not be in the business of
regulating pension plans. ALI FEDERAL SECUITIES CODE § 302(0)(2) Note (3) (Mar. 1978
Draft).
Suggestions were made that the Proposed Official Draft be amended to except interests in
non-contributory, mandatory pension plans from the definition of a security in order to
correct the unsettled state of the law created by the Daniel decision. Cheek, Exemptions
Under the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. R v. 355, 387-88 n.96 (1977).
At its annual meeting on May 19, 1978, the ALI approved the Proposed Official Draft, as
amended, to reflect certain comments made at or before the meeting and authorized the
Reporter to make further changes of an editorial or technical nature. The ALI declined to
take any position on the issue of employee interests in non-contributory mandatory pension
plans. Instead, it authorized the drafting of alternative sections, including one which would
except such interests from the definition of a security (ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE, SUPPLE-
mENT To PROPOSED OFciCIAL DRAFr 4-5 (July 1978) (§ 299.53(b)(10) (undrafted)), and
another which would include such interests within the definition of a security with regard to
exemptions from registration and reporting requirements. Id (§ 302(f)(2)).
The Institute declined to take a position "[b]ecause of (1) the pendency of the Daniel case,
(2) the introduction on May 1, 1978, of S. 3017, 95th Cong., [2d Sess., 124 CoNo. REc.
(1978)] the proposed ERISA Improvements Act of 1978, and (3) the political overtones of
the question. . . ." Id at 5.
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by such expansion. If courts are to continue to perform functions
which are primarily the province of legislatures, it would be desirable
for them to confine their expansions of the law to situations in which
the benefits of those expansions clearly outweigh the costs.
The Daniel court would have done much better if it had performed a
rough but clear-headed cost-benefit analysis. This same approach, ap-
plied in other cases and in other areas of the law, could help other
courts to avoid reaching inefficient results. It would also help to distin-
guish those cases in which it makes economic sense to apply the federal
securities law from those in which it does not.
Appendix A
Cases Filed Seeking Relief Under the Securities Law on Pension or Other Benefit
Plan Claims Since Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsterst
Case name
Case number
Date filed
Type of
Plan (if
known)
Were
ERISA
Counts
Pled?
Were
Other
Counts
Pled?
was the
Claim
Filed as
a Plaintiff
Class Action?
Was the
Pension
Trust Fund
Named as
Defendant?
Was the
Case
Decided
on the
Securities
r."lnIq
Blassie v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Multi Yes Yes No Yes Stayed;-
Butchers Workma of North America
Retirement Plan Trust Fund, No. 76-C-
681 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
Assay v. Hallmark Cards, In., No. C 76- Single No Yes Yes Yes Yes
I (N.D. Iowa 1976)
Stoilzing v. Robbins, No. 770464-CV-W- Mandatory Yes Yes No Yes No
4 (W.D. Mo. June 19, 1977) Noncontributory
Multi
Skytt v. Waggoner, No. 77-1550 (C.D. Mandatory Yes Yes No No No
Cal. 1977) Contributory
Multi
Cinnamon v. Brooks, No. 77-204 (C.D. Multi Yes Yes No No Yes
Cal. March 22, 1977)
Ross v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
No. 77-1650 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1977) Noncontributory
Multi
Pliner v. Central States, Southeast & Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, No. C Noncontributory
77-55 (NJ). Ohio 1977) Multi
Patton v. Central States, Southeast & Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, No. C76- Noncontributory
1354 (N.D. Ohio 1976) Multi
Papuga v. International Bhd. of Team- Mandatory No Yes No No No
sters, No. 77C 2327 (N.D. III. June 29, Noncontributory
1977) Multi
O'Neill v. Marriott, No. M-77-495 (D. Contributory Yes Yes yes No No
Md. 1977) Voluntary
Single
McCart v. Hartzer, No. 76-292-1 (S.D. Mandatory Yes Yes No Yes No
Iowa Sept. 20, 1976) Noncontributory
Multi
Dutchak v. International Bhd. of Team- Mandatory No Yes Yes Yes No
sters, No. 76-C-3803 (N.D. I1. 1976) Noncontributory
Multi
Crabtree v. International Bhd. of Team- Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
sters, No. 76-610 Ky. (E.D. Ky. 1976) Noncontributory
Multi
Coffey v. McCarthy, No. 77-1863-C (D. Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
Mas& 1977) Noncontributory
Multi
Weins v. International Bhd. of Tearms, Mandatory Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. 76-2517-IH (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1976) Noncontributory
Multi
SclaNky v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Single Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Inc., No. 76 C 5799 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
Robinson v. UMW Health & Retirement Multi No Yes Yes Yes yes
Funds No. 770698 (D.D.C. 1977)
Hum v. Reitrement Fund Trust of the Multi Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus. of S.
Cal, No. 76-2487-AAH (CD. Cal. 1976)
Kerch v. General Chauffeurs, Helpers & Mandatory Yes Yes No Yes No
Sales Driven Union Local No. 325, No. Noncontributory
78020096 (W.D. III. Jan. 12, 1978) Multi Ys N
Dudo v. Schaffer, No. 78-467 (ED. Pa. Mandatory No Yes No Yes No
1978) Noncontributory
Multi
t With the exeeption of Robinson v. UMW Health & Retirement Funds, No. 770698 (D.D.C. 1977), all of the cases summarized involve
claims for benefits under pension plans. Robinron involved an employee benefit plan providing permanent health care benefits.
For a discussion of the cases decided on the securities counts, see note 34 ssura.
- Pending the Dam&ddecision.
